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'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the state .. .
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1942 the United States Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC2 established a precedent of federal common law that has now em-
balmed the principle for which it originally stood.3 In D'Oench, the
Court, for the express purpose of maintaining the nation's confidence in
the banking system, held that when the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) takes over a failed bank, the commercial paper it ac-
quires is not subject to certain common law defenses (such as lack of
consideration) that are not apparent on the face of the paper. D'Oench
was based on state common law authority that held that a maker of an
accommodation note could not assert lack of consideration as a defense
to her obligations because of her participation in a scheme (i.e., the crea-
tion of the note) designed to misrepresent the assets of the institution.
Through the course of subsequent case law, D'Oench (now codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e)) has been dramatically expanded in its application and
now essentially precludes the assertion of fraud defenses or causes of ac-
tion against successors to failed banks and savings and loan institutions
(S&Ls). The expansion of D'Oench came at a time when savings and
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
2. 315 U.S. 447 (1942), superseded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674
F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
3. Benjamin Disraeli, in a speech to the House of Commons on February 22, 1848, is
commonly credited with stating that "[a] precedent embalms a principle." JOHN BART-
LETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 502 (Emily M. Beck ed., 1980) (1855).
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loan failures were widespread and, in no small measure, were caused by
the fraud D'Oench removed from the realm of compensable actionable
conduct. D'Oench, which was borne of the systemic bank failures of the
Great Depression and based on a body of state common law creating a
prophylactic rule to prevent fraud, can only be viewed now as ironic in its
application, given the causes of the current crisis gripping the nation's
financial institutions.
Because of the existing common law protections that historically and
presently exist, D'Oench serves as a gap filler, catching within its net
those bank customers against whom no historical common law defense
would have been applicable. Those customers, by and large, are the pas-
sive victims of fraud. Is D'Oench and its progeny now sustaining the na-
tion's confidence in the banking system? The answer is obvious.4
This Article will trace the historic, economic, and legal history of the
D'Oench5 doctrine and compare it to the recent case of Bartram v.
FDIC6 to highlight the irony of the application of the doctrine and to
justify a call for reform. Part One of this Article begins with a brief fac-
tual narrative of Bartram as a demonstration of how D'Oench currently
applies. The Article then chronicles the creation of the FDIC and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in the context
of their historic precedents. Part Two concentrates on the development
of the case law from the legal forebears of D'Oench to its present prog-
eny. Part Two also explores the consequences of the deregulation of
S&Ls in the early 1980s. Finally, Part Three critiques the D'Oench doc-
4. A number of articles have recently appeared that advocate the fundamental
soundness of D'Oench or conclude that D'Oench is not broad enough in its scope. See
Steven A. Weiss & Kenneth E. Kraus, D'Oench, Protection for Private Institutions Assist-
ing the FDIC: A Necessary Component of the Thrift and Bank Bailout, 108 BANKING L.J.
256 (1991) (arguing that the D'Oench doctrine must apply to private participants in bank
bailout efforts); Stephen W. Lake, Note, Banking Law: The D'Oench Doctrine and 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e): Overextended, but Not Unconstitutional, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 315 (1990)
(analyzing potential constitutional issues regarding the far-reaching powers of the FDIC);
William A. MacArthur, Comment, Who Will Stop the Rain? Repairing the Hole in the
D'Oench, Duhme Umbrella by Protecting the FDIC Against Fraudulent Transferee Liability
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1271 (1991) (examining the conflict
between the bankruptcy code and the federal and statutory common law FDIC "super"
powers).
5. With reference to D'Oench, this Article includes the cases that directly apply
D'Oench, as well as cases that apply the purported statutory codification of D'Oench, 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. 111990), and the holder in due course cases which trace
their lineage back to D'Oench but have been decided under a broader federal common law
rubric. The latter two lines of case law arguably would not have been created in the ab-
sence of D'Oench.
6. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the D'Oench doctrine pro-
tects the FDIC from fraud claims brought by former customers of a savings and loan),
review denied, No. S024456, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2115 (Cal. Feb. 27, 1992).
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trine from the viewpoint of its fundamental unfairness and its inefficacy.
This Article finally reviews existing common law contract doctrines that
provide the FDIC with ample legal protection. This Article concludes
that given the already existing common law protections and the original
rationale underlying D'Oench, the doctrine, including its statutory and
federal common law heirs, should be abandoned.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Bartram v. FDIC: Factual Summary7
Donna and Harold Bartram and Vita and Joseph Tessitore (hereafter
the Bartrams) were elderly couples residing in Southern California, who
sought to feather their retirement nests by investing in real estate. The
Bartrams owned four parcels of undeveloped land in Los Angeles
County.8 On May 22, 1985, the broker employed to sell the land in-
formed the Bartrams that he had a buyer willing to swap land with them.9
That buyer was Ramona Savings and Loan Association, a recently ac-
quired thrift located at the time in Orange County, California.' ° Two en-
trepreneurs, John L. Molinaro, a carpet salesman, and his next door
neighbor, Donald P. Mangano, a real estate developer, had acquired
Ramona in April 1984.11
A little over a week after their broker informed them of the potential
buyer, the Bartrams entered into a contract with Ramona whereby they
agreed to transfer to Ramona two parcels they owned in consideration
for thirty-two condominium units owned by Ramona. 2 Unbeknownst to
the Bartrams, Ramona was in serious financial jeopardy at the time, and
its management-mainly in the person of Mr. Molinaro-was engaged
actively in a concerted effort to divest Ramona of most of its real estate
holdings to boost artificially Ramona's book value. 13
7. The facts in this section are not exclusively found in the reported decision, but also
can be found in the appellate briefs filed by the parties. The author served as trial counsel
for the FDIC in this matter and also drafted the FDIC's appellate brief. The facts
presented here originate from the plaintiff's point of view because the complaint was
dismissed prior to trial. The court concluded that even if every fact set forth was true, the
complaint failed to state a cause as a matter of law.
8. Bartram v. FDIC, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No.
S024456, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2115 (Cal. Feb. 27, 1992); see also Respondent's Brief at 2,
Bartram (4th Civ. No. G 009613).
9. Respondent's Brief at 2.
10. Bartram, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
11. FDIC v. Molinaro, 901 F.2d 1490, 1491 (9th Cir. 1990).
12. Bartram, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615. A note for $1,130,850 constituted the difference in
value between the Bartram's land and the higher-priced condominiums. Id.
13. See Molinaro, 901 F.2d at 1491. A joint investigation by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board and the California Department of Savings and Loan revealed that during
[Vol. 43:745
A Precedent Embalms A Principle
As originally contemplated, the transaction fell through, but was rene-
gotiated in mid-June of the same year.14 Molinaro informed the Bar-
tram's broker that Ramona allegedly had appraised the Bartram's land
and discovered a deficiency of $600,000 between the value of their land
and the condominiums.' 5 Molinaro proposed that the Bartrams make up
the difference by executing promissory notes in the amount of the differ-
ence.1 6 While the Bartrams were initially skeptical, Molinaro represented
that Ramona would develop the two parcels it was acquiring, thereby in-
creasing the value of the adjacent land still owned by the Bartrams.17
The transaction closed in early July. 8
Nothing in the promissory notes or other transaction documents made
mention of Ramona's "obligation" to develop the two parcels Ramona
was acquiring. 9 In reality, at the time of the exchange Ramona had no
intention of developing the parcels."z Rather, it secretly found another
purchaser, to whom it later sold the two parcels in a paper transaction,
recording a phony $550,000 profit in the process.2 ' The latter sale was
part of Molinaro's effort to divest Ramona of its real estate holdings and
inflate its net worth.
In January 1986, after the Bartrams learned of Molinaro's deception,
they brought suit in California Superior Court against Ramona, Moli-
naro, and their broker.22 The Bartrams asserted a single claim against
Molinaro and Ramona for fraud in the inducement relating to the sale,
for which they sought $600,000 in compensatory damages.23 Seven and
one-half months later, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board declared
Ramona insolvent and appointed the FSLIC to act as receiver.24 In its
receivership capacity, the FSLIC succeeded to the rights, powers and
privileges of Ramona,25 including the right, acting in the FSLIC's corpo-
1985, the directors of Ramona improperly recorded profits from real estate transactions.
Id.
14. Bartram, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
15. Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Bartram (4th Civ. No. G009613). The Bartram's prom-
issory note was therefore increased to $1,730,000. Id.
16. Bartram, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Respondent's Brief at 3.
21. Id.
22. Bartram, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
23. Id. The damages represented the difference between the property's alleged mar-
ket price and the contract price. Id.
24. Id.; see also FDIC v. Molinaro, 901 F.2d 1490, 1491 (11th Cir. 1990) (describing the
history of Ramona Savings and Loan Association and FSLIC actions as receiver).
25. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729(c)(1), (c)(3), (d) (1988), repealed by Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, Title IV, § 407, 103
1994]
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rate capacity, to prosecute claims against Ramona's former
management.26
Among the assets the FSLIC in its receivership capacity acquired were
the outstanding Bartram notes.27 Ultimately, the Bartrams defaulted on
the notes and the FSLIC received its recourse by way of foreclosure
against the underlying security (the condominiums).28 In the meantime,
the FSLIC in its corporate capacity actively pursued civil action against
Molinaro, among others, for various causes of action including fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty.29 In its receivership capacity, the FSLIC was
substituted for Ramona as a defendant in the suit filed by the Bartrams.
As a consequence of changes in federal law, the FSLIC was abolished
in the summer of 1989, and the FDIC succeeded the FSLIC in the
litigation.3"
The Bartram case went to trial in March 1990. The FDIC was in the
unenviable position of, in essence, justifying and defending the actions of
a person, John Molinaro, against whom they had been prosecuting a civil
fraud action for over three years. Compounding the situation, in the pre-
ceding year Molinaro had been convicted of over thirty counts of bank
Stat. 183, 363. Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA), the FSLIC was replaced with the Savings Associations Insurance Fund
(SAIF). Id. § 211, 103 Stat. at 219 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2) (1988 & Supp. II
1990)).
26. Id.
27. Respondent's Brief at 4, Bartram (4th Cir. No. G 009613).
28. Id.
29. FSLIC v. Molinaro, No. CV-86-6016-AHS (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1987). The
FSLIC's civil suit has been the subject of multiple dispositions in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See FSLIC v. Molinaro, Nos. 91-56423, 91-56212, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 3135 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1993) (affirming district court order for law firm of
defendant to repay excessive attorney's fees and denying district court assessment of sanc-
tions for appeal); FSLIC v. Molinaro, 923 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing district court
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on defendant's law firm); FSLIC v. Ferm, 909 F.2d 372 (9th
Cir. 1990) (affirming district court order of accounting for bills submitted by law firm of
defendant's ex-wife); FSLIC v. Molinaro, 901 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming district
court order of summary judgment against Molinaro to recover two million dollar dividend
paid from a restricted account).
30. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, Title IV, § 401, 103 Stat. 183, 354; see also supra note 25. The Act provides
that:
[n]o action or other proceeding commenced by or against the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation ... shall abate by reason of the enactment of this
Act, except that the appropriate successor to the interests of such Corporation
shall be substituted for the Corporation . . . as a party to any such action or
proceeding.
Id. § 401(f)(2), 103 Stat. at 356.
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fraud as a result of a criminal referral made by the FSLIC to the United
States Attorney.3'
On the first day of the trial, the FDIC raised the exclusionary banner of
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC32 for the first time.33 In a motion in
limine, the FDIC sought to exclude from evidence one fact: the oral mis-
representation of Molinaro, arguing that it was the type of oral "agree-
ment" made unenforceable under D'Oench.34 The trial court agreed,
dismissing the case against the FDIC.35 The California Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action.36 While both rulings
were consistent with the decisional law of the past fifty years, this did not
necessarily make them fair.37
B. The Great Depression and the Creation of the FDIC
In 1928, no regulatory body supervised the nation's financial institu-
tions.38 Instead, only the Federal Reserve System, created in 1913, ex-
isted to regulate the money supply.3 9 The Federal Reserve maintained
money reserves, issued money in the form of bank notes, and loaned
31. On October 5, 1989, John L. Molinaro and his partner Donald P. Mangano were
both convicted of over 30 violations of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1006 by a jury sitting
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. FSLIC v. Moli-
naro, No. CV-86-6016-AHS (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 1989); see also Gregory Couch, Ex-Owners
of S&L in Orange Guilty of Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1989, at 1 (describing the case and
verdict "[i]n the first criminal trial of owners of a failed savings and loan in Southern
California").
32. 315 U.S. 447 (1942), superseded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674
F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
33. Respondent's Brief at 5, Bartram (4th Civ. No. G 009613).
34. Id. The motion in limine sought exclusion of the oral misrepresentation or, in the
alternate, dismissal of the complaint based on the fact that granting the motion in limine
effectively destroyed plaintiffs' one cause of action by removing an essential element, the
misrepresentation itself. Id.
35. Bartram v. FDIC, No. X-480140 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 1990). Technically the
court granted the FDIC's motion to dismiss, which was phrased as a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Id.
36. Bartram v. FDIC, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No.
S024456, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2115 (Cal. Feb. 27, 1992).
37. It should be noted that the Bartrams received a default judgment against Molinaro
in the principal amount of $600,000. Molinaro, who was in prison at the time, was judgment
proof, having had his assets frozen by the FSLIC a number of years prior to the Bartram
matter, and having suffered numerous final money judgments in favor of the FSLIC (and
later FDIC) in the same civil proceeding. See FSLIC v. Molinaro, 901 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir.
1990) (affirming district court order of summary judgment against Molinaro to recover two
million dollar dividend paid from a restricted account).
38. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE 53-54 (1991).
39. GERALD GUNDERSON, A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICA 482 (1976).
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money to banks. 4° In early 1928, while the stock market was making im-
pressive gains, the Federal Reserve took steps to retard excessive specula-
tion by making credit more costly through restrictions on the money
supply.41 The effect of this policy was to raise interest rates.42 Despite
the Federal Reserve's efforts, the market continued its upward spiral.43
The Federal Reserve thereafter sent directives to member banks, urging
them to make only productive loans, and to refuse all loans requested for
speculation in securities.44
Money remained tight through the first three quarters of 1929.45 By
the autumn of 1929, the economy responded, with significant decreases in
the levels of construction and industrial production. 46 The stock market,
however, did not respond, as stock prices continued to increase.47 On
October 24, nearly thirteen million shares were traded, and the market
suffered its most catastrophic loss in history,48 as American wealth in se-
curities had been reduced by twenty-five billion dollars.49
Theories abound as to the causes of the stock market crash. Some ana-
lysts speculate that the market crashed because stock prices were too high
relative to their fundamental basis of value. Others state that stock
purchases on the margin accentuated the decline by making the market
more volatile. Still other market experts attribute the crash to the fact
that investor expectations as represented by stock prices did not meet the
reality of the market as represented by business profits.5" Despite the
existence of numerous divergent theories, all analysts emphasize that the
crash precipitated a major decline in real income. Between 1929 and
40. WILLIAM C. MELTON, INSIDE THE FED 4-7 (1985). "The [Federal Reserve Act]
basically conceived of the Fed as a collection of supercorrespondent banks organized
chiefly to improve the country's payments mechanism and to provide for seasonal currency
needs, while supporting the soundness of banking through its role as lender of last resort."
Id. at 4.
41. HAROLD L. REED, FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY 1921-1930, at 133-35 (1930).
42. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNE J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1867-1960, at 254-56 (1963).
43. Id. at 254.
44. Id. at 255-56. "The [Federal Reserve] Board believed the way to curb security
speculation was to deny rediscounting privileges to member banks making loans on
securities."
45. Louis M. HACKER, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 296 (1970).
46. Id.
47. Id. "The [Federal Reserve] System raised discount rates to high levels; it couldn't
stop the stock market, but, as far as business was concerned... its action came 'probably at
just the right time to do maximum damage.'" Id.
48. Id. at 300; FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 305-08.
49. FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 305-06.
50. See GUNDERSON, supra note 39, at 471-75.
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1930, real income fell by eleven percent; from 1930 to 1931 it declined by
nine percent; and from 1931 to 1932 income decreased by eighteen per-
cent.5 ' In the first four years of the Great Depression, real income
dropped by a whopping thirty-six percent.52
This sudden economic downturn dramatically impacted on banks. In
October 1930, a crop failure in the corn belt spurred a banking crisis in
the Midwest, which had a ripple effect throughout the country.53 When
the dust finally settled, banks with an aggregate of $600 million in depos-
its had closed their doors.54 Runs on banks became frequent and banks
began to rearrange their portfolios, shifting a larger portion of their assets
into cash or securities readily converted to cash such as government
notes.55 A second bank crisis occurred in March 1931, and from February
through August of 1931 bank deposits fell by $2.7 billion.56
By 1933, the unemployment rate stood at twenty-five percent, and the
gross national product had fallen by one-third since the stock market
crash.57 On March 6 of the same year, President Roosevelt, in an unprec-
edented move, declared a bank holiday in order to prevent a run on
United States banks. 8 Between the time of the great crash and the bank
holiday, 9000 banks closed their doors.59
51. Id. at 475.
52. See id.
53. FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 308-09.
54. Id. at 310-11.
55. Id. at 311. Friedman and Schwartz observe that "currency held by the public
stopped declining and started to rise, so that deposits and currency began to move in oppo-
site directions, as in earlier banking crises. Banks reacted as they always had under such
circumstances, each seeking to strengthen its own liquidity position."
Id.
56. Id. at 313-15. In 1932, one economic historian described the situation as follows:
Many of the nation's banks were in shaky condition. Their profits had been re-
duced and frequently entirely eliminated by failing bond prices, defaulted loans
and mortgages, and the necessity of keeping a good portion of their assets in low-
return, liquid assets. Furthermore, the populace-with good reason-generally
considered the banks risky institutions in which to entrust their assets. So when a
few weak banks closed their doors in 1932, the depositors in the other banks
began to descend upon them, anxious to retrieve their assets before the same fate
befell them. It was, of course, a self-fulfilling prophecy. When large numbers of
people believe that a bank will fail, they act so that it does, in fact, fail.
GUNDERSON, supra note 39, at 485-86.
57. JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 173 (1961).
58. Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (1933) (ordering the suspension of banking
transactions and vesting the Secretary of the Treasury with powers to oversee banking
functions); Proclamation No. 2040, 48 Stat. 1691 (1933) (extending the bank holiday be-
yond original time limits).
59. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION: THE FIRST FiFrY YEARS 3 (1984).
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In the face of this overwhelming systemic failure, Congress created and
financed the FDIC as part of the Banking Act of 1933. 6 A fundamental
purpose of the FDIC was to safeguard the deposits of the general public
and increase public trust in the banking system.6 To meet its statutory
duty, the FDIC was given supervisory as well as regulatory control over
federally insured banks.62 In its supervisory capacity, the FDIC was
charged with conducting bank examinations and processing applications
for bank insurance.63 As a regulator, the FDIC was given authority to
propose, amend, and repeal the rules and regulations that specified its
functions.64
Under the statutory scheme created by Congress, deposit insurance
was advanced as a method of restoring public confidence in the banking
system by controlling the economic consequences of bank failure.65 Pur-
suant to this scheme, the FDIC insured its first deposit on January 1,
60. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811 (1988)). The Act stated that the duty of the FDIC was
to purchase, hold, and liquidate ... the assets of national banks which have been
closed by action of the Comptroller of the Currency, or by vote of their directors,
and the assets of State member banks which have been closed by action of the
appropriate state authorities, and by vote of their directors; and to insure, as here-
inafter provided, the deposits of all banks which are entitled to the benefits of
insurance under this section.
Id.
61. Id.; see also 96 CONG. REc. 10,728 (1950) (statement of Rep. Woodhouse) (stating
that "[tlhe fundamental purpose of the FDIC is to protect the millions of small depositors
and build public confidence in the banking system"). One court summarized the charter of
the FDIC:
The FDIC is a corporation originally established during the economic and
banking crisis of the early 1930s when thousands of banks were forced to close
their doors. It was created to restore and reinforce public confidence in the bank-
ing system, to promote safe and sound banking practices and the stability of
banks, to obviate runs on banks by depositors, to safeguard deposits through de-
posit insurance, and to prevent the recurrence of the events of 1931 and 1932
which sapped banking strength and climaxed in the "bank holiday" of March,
1933.
FDIC v. Allen, 584 F. Supp. 386, 397 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (citations omitted).
62. Banking Act § 8, 48 Stat. at 172-76.
63. Id., 48 Stat. at 169. The Act specifies:
Upon receipt of [an] application the [FDIC] shall request the Federal Reserve
Board, in the case of a state member bank, or the Comptroller of the Currency, in
the case of a national bank, to certify upon the basis of a thorough examination of
such bank whether or not the assets of the applying bank are adequate to enable
it to meet all of its liabilities to depositors and other creditors ....
Id.
64. Id., 48 Stat. at 176. The Act states that "[t]he [FDIC] may make such rules, regula-
tions, and contracts as it may deem necessary in order to carry out the provisions of this
section." Id.
65. Richard E. Flint, Why D'Oench, Duhme? An Economic, Legal, and Philosophical
Critique of a Failed Bank Policy, 26 VAL. U. L. Rev. 465, 477 (1992).
[Vol. 43:745
19941 A Precedent Embalms A Principle
1950.66 The main asset of the FDIC was, and continues to be, its insur-
ance fund.6 7 Courts have historically assumed that the FDIC implicitly
has the power, if not the mandate, to preserve and protect its fund. 68 To
this end, courts have consistently acknowledged that the government has
the power to prosecute actions designed to deter acts that are destructive
to the preservation of the FDIC.6 9
C. The Thrift Mission and the Creation of the FSLIC
As far back as the early 1800s, mortgage money in the United States
has been scarce.7' To increase its supply, associations formed to seek de-
posits from local citizens who received interest for the use of their
funds.7 ' These associations expressly encouraged thrift among families,
whose deposits were pooled and used to make mortgage loans to persons
seeking to finance the construction and purchase of residences.72
Prior to the Great Depression, these associations, commonly referred
to as "building and loan associations" or "savings and loan associations"
(S&Ls), were the principal financiers of home mortgages in the United
States.73 By 1931, forty-six of the forty-eight states had laws providing for
supervision of these institutions. 4 There was, however, no federal
agency or regulatory scheme controlling these institutions.75
66. H.R. REP. No. 2564, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
67. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, supra note 59, at 40-46.
68. See, e.g., Doherty v. United States, 94 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 658
(1938).
69. See id. at 498 (stating that "the creation of [the FDIC] was within the constitu-
tional power of the government and the act is a proper basis for prosecutions for acts
destructive of preservation of the agency thus created").
70. JIMMY R. LEwIS, CAL. ASSEMsLY OFF. OF RESEARCH, MORTGAGING THE THRIFT
INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF SAVINGS AND LOANS ii (1990).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW S7, S7
(1991).
74. H. MORTIN BODFISH, HISTORY OF BUILDINGS AND LOANS IN THE UNITED STATES
124 (United States Building and Loan League 1931).
75. The stock market crash of 1929 had a great impact on S&Ls:
After the economy collapsed in 1929, hundreds of thousands of homeowners and
farmers could no longer make the payments on their mortgages. Savings and loan
associations foreclosed and found the property they held was virtually worthless
because few could afford to purchase it. There was panic as depositors tried to
withdraw their savings from the S&Ls. Hundreds of thrifts went broke. Because
there was no national deposit insurance system, many S&L depositors lost their
savings.
LEWIS, supra note 70, at ii.
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From 1929 to 1934, Congress passed a comprehensive body of legisla-
tion, culminating in the creation of the FSLIC in 1934.76 Congress estab-
lished the FSLIC to insure accounts in federal S&Ls and in qualifying
state institutions. The FSLIC's powers paralleled those of the FDIC.
III. THE CASE LAW AND THE DEREGULATION OF THE S&L
INDUSTRY
A. The State Common Law Estoppel Cases
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in D'Oench, state case law that
originated before the turn of the century held that in the context of a
banking transaction, the maker of an accommodation note77 is estopped
from excusing her liability on the note by asserting lack of consideration
as a defense.78 In the typical case, a promissory note payable to a bank is
in default.79 The bank then has another party execute a substitution note
76. This comprehensive legislation is summarized by Professor Felsenfeld:
The New Deal administration proposed, and the Congress enacted, a massive
federal system to regenerate the housing market. Principal among the new de-
pression-stimulated measures were:
1. The Home Loan Bank system, created in 1932, to provide liquidity for the
state savings and loan system and also, albeit secondarily, to arrange direct
loans to consumer borrowers for home ownership purposes.
2. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation established in 1933 principally to
refinance existing home mortgages that were in default or in need of finan-
cial support.
3. The federal system of savings and loan associations, created as a secondary
purpose of the Home Owners Loan Act.
4. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, created and made a
part of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1934, and designed to insure
accounts in federal S&Ls and in qualifying state institutions.
5. The Federal Housing Administration created in 1934 to finance improve-
ments on real estate, to buy and sell mortgages and to insure mortgages
based upon its operations.
6. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, actually created in 1929 during
the Hoover administration. Although its initial primary function was to
provide capital for railroads and industry, it soon loaned money to the state
savings and loan system.
Felsenfeld, supra note 73, at $8-$9 (footnotes omitted).
77. An accommodation maker is defined as "[o]ne who puts his name to a note with-
out any consideration with the intention of lending his credit to the accommodated party."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 16 (6th ed. 1990); see also U.C.C. § 3-415 (1958). In the con-
text discussed herein, the accommodated party is the bank or S&L. The purpose of the
accommodation note is to have the institution's books and records reflect that it is carrying
a "live" asset, as opposed to an asset in default.
78. In re Chamberlain's Estate, 109 P.2d 449, 453-54 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), superseded,
112 P.2d 53 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
79. RICHARD B. HAGEDORN, THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES 2.03[4] (1992).
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which the bank carries on its records as an existing asset.8° The maker
receives no consideration from the bank for making the note, but is
promised that the bank will never collect on the note.8 If the bank
should go into default and be placed in receivership, the receiver, as part
of its statutorily mandated duties, will seek to collect the assets of the
institution by, among other things, enforcing all the outstanding notes
payable to the bank. The note maker's defense of lack of consideration is
invalid because the creation of the note constitutes a fraud on the bank's
depositors and creditors in that it has the tendency to overstate the value
of the bank's assets. The rule has its origin in the contract doctrine of
illegality: the agreement between the bank and the accommodation
maker not to enforce the note violates public policy and thus is not en-
forceable as part of a deceptive scheme. Since the rule is based on the
traditional common law doctrine of illegality, it has no application when
the bank itself seeks to enforce the note because the bank is considered in
pari delicto with the maker.8 2
The case of Pauly v. O'Brien8 3 is typical. On November 15, 1889, Nay-
lor was insolvent and indebted to California National Bank of San Diego
(National) in an amount exceeding $3700.84 Naylor's obligation was evi-
denced by a promissory note secured by jewelry as collateral.85 At the
behest of National's vice president, the defendant gave a note to National
in substitution for the Naylor note.86 The express reason for the creation
80. Id. 7 2.03[5].
81. Id.
82. Normally no recovery, not even restitution, is permitted when a contract contra-
venes public policy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (1981); JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22-1, at 888 (3d ed. 1987); 2
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.9, at 75 (1990) (noting that
"[c]ourts generally do not grant restitution under agreements that are unenforceable on
grounds of public policy" (footnote omitted)). The contract is void ab initio. CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra, § 22-1, at 889. However, restitution may be available if the party seeking
recovery is not considered equally at fault. FARNSWORTH, supra, § 5.9, at 77. "Such a
claimant is said to be not in pari delicto (equally in the wrong) with the other party. Courts
have applied this exception in favor of the victim of misrepresentation or oppression by the
other party." Id. (footnotes omitted). The party seeking recovery bears the burden of
proof and is presumed to be in pari delicto in the absence of such proof. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 198(b) cmt. b (1981); 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 1537-40 (1962); 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1789-91 (3d ed.
1972). This principle explains why the estoppel cases in this Article apply to third parties
and not original parties. It also demonstrates that the estoppel rule is grounded on the
common law contract doctrine of illegality.
83. 69 F. 460 (S.D. Cal. 1895). The majority of the cases cited in this portion of the
Article were expressly cited as precedent by the Supreme Court in D'Oench.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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of the accommodation note was to remove the Naylor note from Na-
tional's "past due" files.87 The bank then foreclosed upon the jewelry
and recouped less than one-third of the amount owed on the original
note.88 However, the Naylor note was entered as paid on National's
books, and the defendant executed another note reflecting the amount
still owed on the Naylor note.89 All notes endorsed by the defendant
were executed without monetary consideration. 90 National was eventu-
ally declared insolvent, and a receiver was appointed.9' The receiver
sought to enforce the note executed by the defendant.92 The defendant
argued, however, that the note was unenforceable for failure of consider-
ation.93 While the court erroneously concluded that consideration was
present,94 it also concluded, more importantly, that even if there was no
consideration, the note was not enforceable because the transaction con-
stituted a "trick to make it appear to the government and to the creditors
and stockholders of the bank that it had a valuable note when in fact it
did not have one.",95
87. Id.
88. Id. at 461.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court observed:
Each and all of the notes executed by the defendant, proceeds the agreed state-
ment, "were given without any other consideration than here stated, and that the
only knowledge said Naylor had of the matter was that [the vice president] told
him that the jewelry had been sold, and applied to the note. The Naylor note had
been carried, and each of the O'Brien notes were carried, among the assets of the
bank upon its books and in its statements to the comptroller, as an asset for their
face."
Id.
91. Id. at 460.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 461.
94. Id. The court, in analyzing the evidence of consideration, held:
Not so, according to the agreed statement of facts, for it is there stated that it was
executed in place of and to take up the note of Naylor, then represented by the
bank officers to be past due, and to be secured by collaterals which were believed
to be ample to pay it, and which they represented the bank wanted to get "out of
the past-due notes," and which, together with the collaterals, were to stand as
collateral to the note executed by the defendant, upon the execution of which the
Naylor note was entered as paid on the books of the bank, and the defendant's
notes was entered thereon "as a discount for its face." It thus appears that the
defendant executed his first note, subsequently renewing it from time to time, and
ultimately by the note in suit, for the purpose of having it take the place of the
Naylor note, which, together with the collaterals, "were to be collateral to the
note" given by him.
Id.
95. Id.
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The Pauly court held that as a matter of "pure justice" a person could
not avail himself of a defense arising from a deceitful transaction.96
Although there was no showing of scienter on the part of the defendant,
the court opined that he could have no other purpose for voluntarily exe-
cuting the note for no monetary consideration than to allow National's
officers to deceptively and fraudulently record its assets.9 7 The court,
however, failed to articulate a carefully constructed estoppel rule.
The court in Putnam v. Chase98 came closer to enunciating a clear rule
of estoppel. In Putnam, the bank's receiver sought to enforce an accom-
modation note executed by Chase in favor of the bank.9 9 The defendant
claimed that the note was executed "for the purpose of increasing its ap-
parent assets, and tiding over financial difficulties."'" In accordance
with "good morals" and "sound public policy,"'' the court held that
under such circumstances the maker was estopped from asserting lack of
consideration as a defense.10 2 The court expressly held that the estoppel
defense would have been available had the plaintiff been the bank since
the bank was in pari delicto, thus implicitly acknowledging that the basis
of its decision was the common law doctrine of illegality.'" 3
The estoppel rule was most clearly elaborated in Denny v. Fishter.'
°4
In Denny the state banking commissioner, acting as receiver for a failed
bank, sought to enforce the obligation of an accommodation maker on a
note.'0 5 Evidence showed that the maker had no positive idea of com-
mitting any fraud; however, the court nonetheless deemed him liable.1
0 6
96. Id. The court stated that in such a case "the result must be the same, for, when
parties employ legal instruments of an obligatory character for fraudulent and deceitful
purposes, it is sound reason, as well as pure justice, to leave him bound who has bound
himself." Id.
97. Id. at 462.
98. 212 P. 365 (Or. 1923).
99. Id. at 366.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 367.
102. Id. at 366. The court noted:
It seems.., to be well settled by the great weight of authority that, where a bank
commissioner or other statutory receiver takes over the assets of an insolvent for
the purpose of liquidation, such defense is not available, and the maker of a note
given, as this one confessedly was, to deceive the bank examiner into a false find-
ing as to the sufficiency of the bank's assets, is estopped from asserting such
defense.
Id.
103. Id.
104. 36 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1931).
105. Id. at 865.
106. Id. at 867-68.
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Relying on a note in the Harvard Law Review, 10 7 the court delineated the
parameters of an estoppel rule. 08 More importantly, however, the court
clearly articulated the need for an estoppel rule in the context of the
banking business. °9
Denny and Paulson, while ostensibly phrased as postulating estoppel
rules, analytically formulated rules based on the common law notion of
illegality. Traditionally, the notion of equitable estoppel is premised on
damage. Estoppel is not invoked unless its invocation prevents an injus-
tice. 1 ° In the state common law estoppel cases, however, there was no
compelling evidence that any bank depositors or creditors were harmed.
The damage found was all hypothetical. An illegality rule is prophylactic,
seeking to prevent harm before it is accomplished. Without stating so,
the courts in the state common law estoppel cases bifurcated the execu-
tion of the note from one of its terms (i.e., the agreement not to enforce
the note) and treated that term as void because of illegality. Technically
the rule is one of estoppel because the note maker is literally prevented
or estopped from asserting lack of consideration as a defense to her con-
tractual obligations.
107. Note, Liability on a Note Given to a Bank as a Fictitious Asset, 38 HARV. L. REV.
239 (1924).
108. Denny, 36 S.W.2d at 867. The court relied on the estoppel analysis when fraud is
an element of the note:
By giving his note the maker causes a misrepresentation of the bank's assets. The
misrepresentation may reach creditors through various channels, among which
are published statements of the bank and reports of the bank examiner, an official
created by the public to protect creditors. The very continuance in business of a
bank which would have been closed by the examiner but for the deception is in a
sense a misrepresentation. Many creditors may suffer change of position upon the
faith of this misrepresentation.
Note, supra note 107, at 242 (quoted in Denny, 36 S.W.2d at 867).
109. The court quoted the Kansas Supreme Court's holding in Cedar State Bank v.
Olson, 226 P. 995 (Kan. 1924):
The banking business is fraught with public concern. Banks do business through
permission of the law subject always to its provisions for the protection of deposi-
tors, creditors, and stockholders. Public faith, credit, and honesty in business
transactions are a bank's main assets.... The statute requires careful examination
by the bank commissioner periodically in order that those who deal with banks
may not be misled by appearances. To sanction any arrangement, whereby the
real assets and securities of a bank are to be regarded as less than or different
from the apparent assets and securities, would tend to defeat the entire purpose
of the regulatory statutes.
Id. at 997 (quoted in Denny, 36 S.W.2d at 867).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1979) (stating that "[a]
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance
is enforceable ... if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise").
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The passage of the Banking Act of 1933111 enacted laws that evidenced
this prophylactic concern. The Act contained numerous provisions
designed to protect bank depositors and creditors, including laws that es-
tablished minimum capital requirements for banks and prohibited trans-
actions tending to impair a bank's capital stock." 2 The Act also made it a
criminal offense for a bank officer or director to aid and abet any person
in the violation of these laws. 1 3
The Supreme Court first addressed the state common law estoppel rule
in the context of the National Banking Act in Deitrick v. Greaney.14 In
Deitrick, Boston National Bank purchased 190 shares of its own capital
stock in violation of federal law." 5 The defendant, a bank officer, in-
duced another individual to execute an accommodation note payable to
the bank as part of a transaction to conceal the bank's ownership of the
stock." 6 The bank assured the defendant that the note would never be
called due." 7 When the bank became insolvent and was placed in receiv-
ership, the receiver sued the defendant for the sums owing on the note."18
The trial court found for the receiver, holding that the defendant accom-
modation note maker was estopped from employing a lack of considera-
tion defense." 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed the trial court's decree as it pertained to the note maker's liabil-
ity,'2 ° and the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.' 2 1
In Deitrick, the execution of the note itself was not violative of the
capital stock law; however, criminal liability could be predicated on the
111. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
112. Id. §§ 16, 17, 48 Stat. at 184-86 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 51, 83
(1988)).
113. Id. § 19, 48 Stat. at 187 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 334, 656, 1005
(1988)).
114. 309 U.S. 190 (1940), superseded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674
F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1982).
115. Id. "The obvious purpose of prohibiting the purchase by a bank of its own stock is
to prevent the impairment of its capital resources and the consequent injury to its creditors
in the event of insolvency." Id. at 195.
116. Id. at 192. In a complicated series of transactions, the proceeds of the promissory
note were deposited in another bank to the credit of the defendant, who then paid the
proceeds to the bank for the shares of stock. Id. The shares were then transferred to the
party who had executed the note, id., and later defendant himself executed a promissory
note to the bank. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 193.
119. Deitrick v. Greaney, 23 F. Supp. 758, 760 (D. Mass. 1938), modified, 103 F.2d 83
(1st Cir. 1939), rev'd, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
120. Greaney v. Deitrick, 103 F.2d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 1939), rev'd, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
121. Deitrick, 309 U.S. at 201.
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defendant's status as an aider and abettor. 122 The problem was that the
action was a civil case for enforcement of a note. The Court began its
opinion by noting that the purpose of the National Banking Act was to
protect bank depositors and creditors by, among other things, preventing
banks from impairing their own capital stock.' 23 The bank clearly vio-
lated the statute by purchasing its own stock and defendant was clearly
aware of the unlawful purpose of the entire transaction. 124 The Court
treated defendant's participation as unlawful and stated that if defendant
"were free to set up the unlawful agreement as a defense and thus cast
the loss from the unlawful stock purchase on the creditors of the bank...
he would be enabled to defeat the purpose of the statute by taking advan-
tage of an agreement which it condemns as unlawful."' 25
The Court, however, correctly chose not to fashion an estoppel rule
because the record was barren of any evidence that depositors or credi-
tors had been damaged.' 26 Rather, the Court fashioned an illegality rule
that made the agreement not to enforce the note unenforceable as a pro-
phylactic way of preventing circumvention of the underlying capital im-
pairment statute.
127
122. Id. at 194. "To insure performance of these duties and as a safeguard to creditors
and the public, violation of the provisions of the [National Banking] Act by any director or
officer of the bank or by any person aiding or abetting him, is made a criminal offense, and
in the event of such a violation, the association may be required to forfeit all its rights and
privileges." Id.
123. Id. at 194; see also supra note 102. The Court commented:
The[ ] purposes [of the Act] would be defeated and the command of the statute
nullified if a director or officer or any other by his connivance could place in the
bank's portfolio his obligation good on its face, as a substitute for its stock ille-
gally acquired, and if he remained free to set up that the obligation was, in effect,
fictitious, intended only to aid in the accomplishment of the injury at which the
statute is aimed.
Deitrick, 309 U.S. at 195.
124. Deitrick, 309 U.S. at 195-96.
125. Id. at 196.
126. Id. at 198. The Court noted that "as the purpose of the statute is to protect credi-
tors of the bank from the hazard of violations of the Act... it is immaterial that the bank's
officers were participants in the illegal transaction, or that the receiver has not shown that
the creditors have been deceived or specifically injured as the result of the illegal contract."
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
127. Id. The Court stated:
[Tihe doctrine with which we are now concerned is not strictly that of estoppel as
thus defined. It is a principle which derives its force from the circumstances that
respondent's act, apart from its possible injurious consequences to creditors, is
itself a violation of the statute; and that the statute, read in the light of its pur-
poses and policy, precludes resort to the very acts which it condemns, as the
means of thwarting those purposes by visiting on the receiver and creditors whom
he represents the burden of the bank's unlawful purchase.
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The case law prior to D'Oench demonstrated a policy concern with
transactions that tended to undermine the public's confidence in the ac-
curacy of the books and records of the financial institutions in which it
deposited money. 2 ' The concern did not focus on any damages caused,
but on the undermined confidence of the public. 2 9 This concern led to
the creation of a rule that, while ostensibly phrased as estoppel, was actu-
ally more consistent with traditional contract rules regarding the enforce-
ability of illegal bargains.' 30 Given the gravity of the Great Depression,
... It is the evil tendency of the prohibited acts at which the statute.is aimed,
and its aid, in condemnation of them, and in preventing the consequences which
the Act was designed to prevent, may be invoked by the receiver representing the
creditors for whose benefit the statute was enacted.
Id. at 198-99 (citations omitted).
Actually the rule fashioned by the Court had elements of both estoppel and illegality. If
the creation of the note was an integral part of the criminal transaction, which it clearly
was, the entire transaction would be void. However, the Court bifurcated the execution of
the note from the agreement not to enforce the note, treating the side agreement as illegal.
Id. at 198. By doing so, the Court took the only appropriate step: it mixed notions of
estoppel with illegality by affirming the validity of the note but estopping the maker from
raising a defense of lack of consideration. Id. at 198-99. The overriding concern in Dei-
trick, similar to the state common law estoppel cases, was the misrepresentation created by
the creation of the accommodation note. Id. at 198.
128. See supra notes 77-110 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 77-110 and accompanying text.
130. See Niblack v. Farley, 122 N.E. 160, 162 (Iil. 1919) (holding that "[i]t would be
contrary to public policy and good morals to permit defendant to take advantage of the
fraudulent agreement with the bank as against the rights of creditors"); Iglehart v. Todd,
178 N.E. 685, 689 (Ind. 1931) (stating that "[tihe liability of a maker of accommodation
paper rests upon the principle of estoppel, and arises only when the rights of third parties
intervene-as to which parties he is estopped from denying liability"); Cedar State Bank v.
Olson, 226 P. 995, 997 (Kan. 1924) (holding that "[h]aving given the note with the avowed
object of having it appear as an asset for purposes of examination, [a party] is estopped
from asserting a secret understanding that she was not to be held liable"); Parker v. Parker,
282 N.W. 897, 900 (Mich. 1938) (stating that "[t]he maker of [an unenforceable] note is
estopped from denying liability on the ground of its fictitious character"); German-Ameri-
can Fin. Corp. v. Merchants' & Mfrs.' State Bank, 225 N.W. 891, 893 (Minn. 1929) (finding
that party was estopped from asserting rights under fraudulent note); Schmid v. Haines,
178 A. 801, 803 (N.J. 1935) (finding that "an accommodation party to a note given ... to
deceive the bank examiner into a false finding as to the sufficiency of the bank's assets, is
estopped from asserting such defense"); Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 5 N.E.2d 196,
197 (N.Y. 1936) (holding that "[p]ublic policy requires that a person who, for the accom-
modation of the bank, executes an instrument which is in form a binding obligation, should
be estopped from thereafter asserting that simultaneously the parties agreed that the in-
strument should not be enforced"); Valley v. Devaney, 194 N.W. 903, 906 (N.D. 1923)
(stating that "[w]here a note or other obligation is given to a bank with the avowed object
of its appearing as assets for purposes of public examination, those who purport to be
liable upon the obligation are estopped"); Ohio ex rel. Lattanner v. Hills, 113 N.E. 1045,
1047 (Ohio 1916) (applying rule of estoppel on the grounds that "it would ... be entirely
inequitable to permit the defendant to avert liability on his note on the ground that there
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and the massive bank failures, this "perceptions" concern became para-
mount in the jurisprudence that followed.
B. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC131
In 1926, D'Oench, Duhme & Co., a securities dealer, sold certain
bonds to Belleville Bank & Trust Co. and executed certain notes payable
to the bank. 3 2 The bonds later went into default, and in 1933, D'Oench
executed renewal notes in favor of the bank to enable the bank to carry
the renewal notes and not show any past due bonds on its books and
records.' 33 The notes on their face were non-negotiable.1 34 A receipt to
the notes expressly provided that the notes would not be called due.1 35
Interest payments on the notes were thereafter made to keep them "as
live paper.' 36 D'Oench was aware that the renewal notes were executed
so that the past due bonds would not appear among the assets of the
bank.' 37 In 1935, the bonds were charged off the bank's records.13
8
Three years later, the FDIC acquired the notes as part of the collateral
securing a one million dollar loan made in connection with the assump-
tion of the bank's deposit liabilities by another institution.' 39 No evi-
dence revealed that the execution of the accommodation notes damaged
any of the bank's depositors or creditors. 4 °
The FDIC sued D'Oench to enforce the notes.' 4 1 D'Oench defended
on the grounds of lack of consideration. 42 The trial court held that,
under state law, the FDIC was a holder in due course and acquired the
notes free from all personal defenses.' 43 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 44
was a want or failure of consideration for said note"); Arthur v. Brown, 74 S.E. 652, 654
(S.C. 1912) (applying rule of estoppel for parties who put forward a fraudulent note).
131. 315 U.S. 447 (1942), superseded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674
F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). See supra note 3.
132. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 454.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The notes stated: "This note is given with the understanding it will not be called
for payment. All interest payments to be repaid." Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The FDIC had insured the bank since January 1, 1934. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 453-54.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 455.
144. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 117 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 447
(1942), superseded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
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The D'Oench case came before the Supreme Court in the wake of its
decision four years earlier in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins'45 and ostensibly
presented a choice of law issue.'4 6 Rather than simply affirming the mat-
ter under state law, however, the Court chose to fashion a rule of federal
common law.1 47 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas ex-
amined the Federal Reserve Act and found that it reflected a federal pol-
icy to protect the FDIC "and the public funds which it administers,
against misrepresentation as to the securities or other assets in the portfo-
lios of the banks which [the FDIC] insures." '148 Justice Douglas con-
cluded that if D'Oench had acted intentionally to deceive the FDIC,
Deitrick would have been on point. 49 The Court interpreted Deitrick as
creating an estoppel rule, which made the lack of consideration defense
unavailable to accommodation note makers. 150
Since D'Oench could not have acted to deceive the FDIC because the
FDIC had not been created at the time the renewal notes were executed,
Justice Douglas turned to the state common law estoppel cases as author-
ity for a broader estoppel rule not based on a scienter requirement and
145. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 455-56. The petitioner D'Oench claimed that the contract
was governed by the laws of Missouri, and it would be "against the public policy of Mis-
souri to hold a citizen of Missouri liable on an accommodation note under the facts of this
case." Id. at 449. The petitioner further argued that under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941),
a federal court sitting in Missouri must apply Missouri's conflict of law rules; that
if, as was the case here, Illinois law was not pleaded or proved, a Missouri court
would have ascertained Illinois law from Missouri decisions, since in such a case
Illinois law would be presumed to be the same as Missouri law; and that the Dis-
trict Court was bound to follow that same course.
D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 455.
147. Id. at 459.
148. Id. at 457. The court cited section 12B(s) of the Federal Reserve Act, which
stated:
Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining any loan from the [FDIC] ... or for the
purpose of influencing in any way the action of the [FDIC] under this section,
makes any statement, knowing it to be false, or willfully overvalues any security,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not
more than two years, or both.
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 177. The Court also relied on subsection (y)
of the Act, which provided for insurance for the bank under the aegis of the FDIC.
D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 457.
149. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 457. The Court noted that under Deitrick, "the defendant
could not rely on his wrongful act to defeat the obligation as against the receiver of the
bank." Id. at 458.
150. Id. The Court observed that the rule prohibiting an accommodation note maker
from asserting lack of consideration as a defense was not limited to violations of a statute,
as "an accommodation maker is not allowed that defense as against the receiver of the
bank and its creditors, or at times even as against the bank itself, where his act contravenes
a general policy to protect the institution of banking from secret agreements." Id.
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not premised on a theory of damage. 151 He concluded that the root of
the rule did not lie in injury, but rather in the "'evil tendency' " created
by the acts.' 52 Justice Douglas reasoned that even if D'Oench actually
did not know the note was used to deceive, its knowledge would be pre-
sumed since "[p]lainly one who gives such a note to a bank with a secret
agreement that it will not be enforced must be presumed to know that it
will conceal the truth from the vigilant eyes of the bank examiners. "153
The Court then fashioned the D'Oench rule, a rule that would become
imbedded in the judicial system. The Court stated:
The test is whether the note was designed to deceive the credi-
tors or the public authority, or would tend to have that effect. It
would be sufficient in this type of case that the maker lent him-
self to a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority
on which [the FDIC] relied in insuring the bank was or was
likely to be misled.
154
Because the Court fashioned a rule of federal common law, it did not
view the animating force behind the rule as the actual banking public, but
deemed the public's federal representative, the FDIC, to be the impetus
for the rule.' 55 Although the lower court's decision was premised on a
finding that the FDIC was a holder in due course, Justice Douglas' opin-
ion made no mention of this issue.1 56
In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter objected to the creation of
a federal common law rule, expressing the opinion that D'Oench could be
151. Id.; see also cases cited supra note 130. The court cited Mount Vernon Trust Co. v.
Bergoff, 5 N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1936), which held that "[p]ublic policy requires that a person
who, for the accommodation of the bank executes an instrument which is in form a binding
obligation, should be estopped from thereafter asserting that simultaneously the parties
agreed that the instrument should not be enforced." Id. at 197 (quoted in D'Oench, 315
U.S. at 459).
152. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 459 (quoting Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 198 (1940)).
The Court stated:
Those principles are applicable here, because of the federal policy evidenced in
this Act to protect [the FDIC], a federal corporation, from misrepresentations
made to induce or influence the action of [the FDIC], including misstatements as
to the genuineness or integrity of securities in the portfolios of banks which it
insures or to which it makes loans.
Id.
153. Id. at 460.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 459-60. Such an intent is witnessed by the Court's statement that "[c]learly
[the FDIC] is a member of the creditor class which the banking authorities were intended
to protect." Id. at 460.
156. Justice Frankfurter, in a separate concurrence, was the only member of the court
to acknowledge the possibility of the FDIC as a holder in due course. Id. at 463 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
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decided solely on state common law precedent. 157 Justice Frankfurter
found no support in Justice Douglas' opinion from either federal statutes
or Deitrick.'58 Justice Jackson, in his separate concurrence, grounded the
D'Oench rule on equitable principles, implicitly acknowledging that ab-
sent some deceptive arrangement, the D'Oench rule would not apply and
such cases would be governed by normal state law rules concerning com-
mercial paper.1 59
In large measure, the Supreme Court's decision in D'Oench was based
on the state common law estoppel precedents and was similarly framed in
terms of a rule of estoppel.' 6 The estoppel rule was of course relaxed:
there was no strict scienter requirement and no damage requirement.' 6 1
By failing to predicate the rule on a more sound basis of illegality, the
Court left the door open for its application to situations where the books
and records of the financial institution do not accurately reflect the trans-
action. If the rule had been predicated solely on the involvement of the
note maker in an illegal transaction or, at the very least, a transaction
contrary to public policy, the rule would turn on the culpability of the
maker. By fashioning a rule based on the "evil tendency" created by cer-
tain transactions, the Court focused more on the effect of the transactions
on the perceived status (i.e., paper value) of the institution, rather than
on the participation or culpability of the defendant.'62
157. Id. at 463-64. Justice Frankfurter noted that "[wiere this Court, in the absence of
federal legislation, to make its own choice of law, Illinois or Missouri law would furnish the
governing principles." Id. (citations omitted).
158. Id. Justice Frankfurter commented:
Of course the policy expressed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act might be
violated, as the National Bank Act was violated in the Deitrick case, wholly apart
from any question of estoppel or proof of loss to the [FDIC]. Our difficulty is
that the statute cannot be stretched to fit this case. And it seems unnecessary to
force such a result when a solution according to settled doctrines is available.
Id. at 465.
159. Id. at 473-74 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson stated that "[t]he [FDIC]
would succeed only to the rights which the bank itself acquired where ordinary and good-
faith commercial transactions are involved." Id. at 474.
160. See supra note 130.
161. Justice Douglas noted that "[tlhough petitioner was not a participant in this partic-
ular transaction and, so far as appears, was ignorant of it, nevertheless it was responsible
for the creation of the false status of the note in the hands of the bank." D'Oench, 315
U.S. at 461 (majority opinion). Justice Douglas also observed that "[t]he federal policy
expressed in the Act, like its counterpart in state law, is not dependent on proof of loss or
damage caused by the fraudulent practice." Id.
162. The Court noted that "[tihe[ I provisions [of the Federal Reserve Act] reveal a
federal policy to protect [the FDIC], and the public funds which it administers, against
misrepresentations as to the securities or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which
[the FDIC] insures or to which it makes loans." Id. at 457.
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D'Oench, however, can be justified on its facts. An accommodation
note maker, almost by definition, executes a contract he knows will not
be enforced. What purpose can the note have other than artifice? More-
over, how can a person not be at least negligent in signing on to such an
agreement? If D'Oench had been thereafter limited to these types of
collusive arrangements (the creation of a phony contract), its present ap-
plication would not be so problematic. In large measure, the current
problems in the case law can be directly traced back to the sweeping lan-
guage used by the Court in its opinion.
C. D'Oench's Progeny
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
In 1950, eight years after the Supreme Court decided D'Oench, Con-
gress amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 163 to allow the FDIC
to rely exclusively on the facial validity of a closed bank's books and
records. 164 Section 1823(e) of Title 12 provides that any agreement in-
fringing upon the interests of the FDIC in an asset, acquired under its
corporate capacity, is invalid unless certain conditions are met.165 Con-
gress' enactment of section 1823(e) raises the question whether it repre-
sents a statutory codification of the D'Oench rule. 166  The sparse
legislative history behind section 1823(e) reveals that, in enacting the stat-
163. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (codified
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
164. Id. § 2(13), 64 Stat. at 888 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
165. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988). The statute provides:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest of
the [FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as security for a
loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the [FDIC] unless such agreement (1)
shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and the person or
persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contempo-
raneously with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall have been ap-
proved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee, which
approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and (4)
shall have been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of
the bank.
Id.
166. The Chairman of the FDIC at the time testified before the House of Representa-
tives Committee on Banking and Currency that "[tihe bill before your committee... may
be characterized as a codification of the law pertaining to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation." Amendments to Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 1950: Hearings on S. 2822
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 (1950) (state-
ment of Maple T. Harl, Chairman, FDIC).
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ute, Congress was not interested in expanding the FDIC's existing pow-
ers, but sought instead to define them more rigidly.167
Similar to D'Oench, section 1823(e) invalidates claims or defenses
against the FDIC based on secret side agreements. For example, the ac-
commodation note maker's oral agreement with the bank not to enforce
the note is invalid under both D'Oench and the statute.168 Section
1823(e)'s technical requirements, however, are narrower in the sense that
so long as the nonenforcement agreement becomes an official bank rec-
ord it is enforceable. 69 Of course, in the context of an accommodation
note, officially recording its unenforceability utterly defeats the purpose
of artificially inflating an institution's asset value. Furthermore, section
167. The following discussion between Congressman Multer and the director of the
FDIC, Earl Cook, illustrates this concern:
Mr. MULTER. There has been considerable litigation through the years during
the existence of the Corporation [FDIC] in which contentions have been made
that agreements between the banks and debtors have not been lived up to after
the banks were closed down and that the FDIC, in collecting the assets of the
bank, was put in a more favorable position than the bank itself would have been
and that the FDIC could ignore agreements with debtors .... Can you tell us
briefly whether or not there is any objection to putting into this proposed law an
amendment to require the FDIC to comply with any such agreements that have
been made in good faith and which are properly recorded between the debtors
and the banks?
Mr. COOK. I think that statement of yours covered the grounds where you are
properly supported by such agreements and are not dependent upon oral agree-
ments that have no binding effect.
Mr. MULTER. I think the policy of your bank [FDIC] is to honor any such bo-
nafide agreement.
Mr. COOK. We never back away from a bonafide agreement, and when the rec-
ord is clear we inherit the obligation and stand by it. We cannot be bound when
there is no record.
Id. at 41-42. This concern is reinforced by debate from the House of Representatives:
It was never the intention of Congress to give to the [FDIC] a stronger position
than that of the bank and the adoption of the amendment, my amendment is
offered to prove that heretofore it was the intent of Congress that any agreement
in the absence of fraud, was binding on the [FDIC].
86 CONG. REC. 10,732 (1950) (statement of Rep. Walter). The Congressman's assertion
that the amendment would not give the FDIC a stronger position than the bank is wrong as
a matter of law. A better assertion would have been that the amendment would not
change existing common law nor give the FDIC a stronger position than an ordinary suc-
cessor of a bank (a receiver) or acquirer of a bank's assets (a potential holder-in-due-
course). A receiver of a bank under the common law does not merely stand in the shoes of
the bank, because at least in theory the receiver represents different interest such as the
interests of creditors of the bank. For this reason, an estoppel argument that could be
asserted by a receiver may not be available to a bank. Section 1823(e) codifies this princi-
ple. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
168. See infra notes 356-58.
169. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (requiring that a nonenforcement agreement "shall have
been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the bank").
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
1823(e) is narrower than D'Oench because, at the time of its passage, it
applied expressly to the FDIC in its corporate capacity and not its receiv-
ership capacity.' 71
At the same time, however, the statute is broader than D'Oench in that
it lacks a scienter requirement.17 1 While D'Oench involved a situation
where the note maker's culpability was at least presumed, 72 section
1823(e), by not limiting its application to specified arrangements (e.g.,
accommodation notes), invalidates all arrangements falling outside of its
strictures regardless of the culpability of the bank customer. 173 More-
over, the statute says nothing about the existence of a "deceptive
scheme" or the ignorance of the FDIC with respect to the scheme. 74
This discussion leads one back to the question of whether the statute
codified D'Oench.175 Given the relative propinquity in time to D'Oench
and Congress' obvious awareness of the case, the statute would appear to
170. See H.R. REP. No. 2564, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (discussing the principal changes in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act that govern the FDIC in its corporate capacity).
171. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823.
172. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942) ("Plainly one who
gives such a note to a bank with a secret agreement that it will not be enforced will be
presumed to know that it will conceal the truth from the vigilant eyes of the bank examin-
ers."), superseded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
173. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
174. Id. A number of cases expressly hold that whether or not the FDIC has knowl-
edge of a defense at the time it acquires the asset is irrelevant for purposes of section
1823(e). See FDIC v. Investors Assocs. X., Ltd., 775 F.2d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1985) (stat-
ing that "[riegardless of the FDIC's knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action, the fraudulent scheme is still contrary to public policy and the wrongdoer should
not be able to benefit from something that transpired during the course of such scheme");
FDIC v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 725 F.2d 634, 640 (11th Cir.) (noting that "[ijf in undertak-
ing a purchase and assumption transaction FDIC's closed-bank division were held to mat-
ters of which the open-bank examiners had actual knowledge, but beyond the scope of Sec.
1823(e), the protection of Sec. 1823(e) would be lost"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984);
FDIC v. de Jesus Velez, 678 F.2d 371, 375 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating that "[k]nowledge by the
FDIC ... [is] not relevant"); FDIC v. MM&S Partners, 626 F. Supp. 681, 684 (N.D. I11.
1985) (holding that "the need for certainty and the conclusive presumption of maker
knowledge that he is deceiving the FDIC when he knows his collateral agreement has not
met § 1823(e) standards makes FDIC knowledge irrelevant"); FDIC v. First Mortgage In-
vestors, 485 F. Supp. 445, 451 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (invalidating any knowledge requirement
because "the FDIC need not go beyond the bank records in performing its functions").
For this reason, section 1823(e) is not truly analogous to a holder-in-due course statute that
would require for its application that the party acquiring the commercial paper have no
notice of any personal defenses to which the paper is subject. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-
302(a)(2)(vi) (1990) (requiring that a holder in due course takes the instrument "without
notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment"). Of course, subsequent case
law has erroneously treated section 1823(e) as conferring holder in due course status to the
FDIC. See infra notes 271 and 276.
175. A number of cases have expressly held that 1823(e) is a codification of D'Oench.
See FDIC v. Van Laanen, 769 F.2d 666, 667 (10th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping
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be, if not a codification of D'Oench, at least an attempt to define more
technically its parameters. Section 1823(e), by virtue of its expansive lan-
guage (i.e., the lack of a scienter requirement or an ignorance or damage
requirement), is not so much a rule of estoppel as it is a rule based on
notions of illegality. Section 1823(e) is a prophylactic rule making certain
agreements strictly unenforceable and can be viewed as a federal statute
of frauds and corporate authority requirement.176
2. Expansion Through the Case Law
a. Party Expansion
For the first thirty years of its resilient life, courts often cited D'Oench
as an example of federal common law, 7 7 but rarely relied upon the hold-
ing for any substantive proposition. 17 The Supreme Court did not revisit
the issues raised in D'Oench until 1987,'179 and expansion of its holding
did not begin until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time,
D'Oench has been expanded in two areas: (1) the parties for whom the
D'Oench doctrine applies; 8 ° and (2) the claims and defenses against
which the doctrine has attached.' 8 1
Expansion of the parties to which D'Oench applies is the less problem-
atic area. Although the expansion occurred recently, it can trace its line-
age directly to the original rationale of D'Oench. The parties for whom
D'Oench is applicable have been expanded in three categories.
First, D'Oench on its face created a federal common law rule of estop-
pel for the FDIC based on the national interest in uniformly protecting
federally insured banks.' 2 Given this logic, it would be natural to expect
Ctr., Inc., 766 F.2d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1985); Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d
743, 746 (7th Cir. 1981); MM&S Partners, 626 F. Supp. at 683.
176. See Kevin A. Palmer, The D'Oench Doctrine: A Proposal For Reform, 108 BANK-
ING L.J. 565, 569 (1991) (avoiding payment of a debt should be supported by a written
agreement and authorized by appropriate bank officials).
177. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (holding
that the principles formulated by judicial law are necessary to protect federal interests),
superseded by statute as stated in Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301, 305 (1947) (stating that in the absence of a public law, federal courts can establish
the governing law), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Trammel, 899 F.2d
1483, 1486 (6th Cir. 1990); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945), overruled
by Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
178. From 1942 to 1970, there appears to be only one court of appeals case substan-
tively decided under D'Oench. See FDIC v. Alker, 151 F.2d 907 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 799 (1946).
179. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
180. See infra notes 184-85, 188-89.
181. See infra note 193.
182. See infra note 297.
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
it to be of equal importance and applicability to the FSLIC. 8 3 Since
1945, therefore, the policies enunciated in D'Oench have been held to be
applicable to cases involving the FSLIC, 8 4 although it was not until the
past several years that courts have held expressly that D'Oench applies
with equal force to the FSLIC. 18
5
Second, the D'Oench case involved the FDIC acting in its corporate
capacity to facilitate the transfer of a failed bank's assets to another
bank.' 86 The FDIC, by statute, may act in two distinct capacities: (1) as a
receiver for a failed bank, and (2) as an independent federal corpora-
tion.' 87 Although D'Oench technically involved the FDIC acting only as
a federal corporation, based on the Court's reliance on the state common
law estoppel cases (which invariably involved state receivers), D'Oench
would logically seem to apply to the FDIC in its receivership capacity as
well. "'88 To the extent there was any ambiguity as to the scope of
D'Oench's application, subsequent case law has stated clearly that
183. The FSLIC was created in 1934 and made part of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. See National Housing Act, ch. 847, Title IV, 48 Stat. 1246, 1255 (1934). The FSLIC
was designed to insure depositors' accounts in federal S&Ls and qualifying state institu-
tions. Id. § 403, 48 Stat. at 1257.
184. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Kearney Trust Co., 151 F.2d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 1945) (stating
that, if the policy espoused in D'Oench were not controlling, "the consequences resulting
from violations of the statutory prohibitions enacted by Congress for the protection of
these national institutions would be subject to conflicting local laws unrelated to the uni-
form purpose of the Acts").
185. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., Inc., 880 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that the federal policy should protect the FSLIC as it protects the FDIC); Taylor Trust
v. Security Trust Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 844 F.2d 337, 344 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
result in D'Oench applies); FSLIC v. Lafayette Inv. Properties, Inc., 855 F.2d 196, 198 (5th
Cir. 1988) (determining that the common law doctrine established by D'Oench applies to
both the FDIC and the FSLIC); Firstsouth, F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441, 443
(8th Cir. 1988) (holding that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), which codifies the holding in D'Oench,
can be used to protect the FSLIC).
186. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 461 (1942) (noting that "re-
spondent [FDIC] is suing here to protect its rights as an insurer"), superseded by statute as
stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
187. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (stating that in its corporate
capacity, the FDIC "shall insure the deposits of all insured banks as provided in this chap-
ter"); id. § 1822(a) (stating that its receiver capacity, the FDIC "as receiver of a closed
national bank.., shall have the right to appoint an agent or agents to assist in its duties as
such receiver"); see also 1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS § 1.3.3,
at 47-52 (1988). The same was also true of the FSLIC. Id. § 1.3.4, at 54.
188. The state common law estoppel cases, although phrased in terms of estoppel rules,
more properly have their etymology in the contract notion of illegality. See cases cited
supra note 130. For this reason the rule does not, and should not, apply to the actual
contracting parties, but instead to innocent third parties such as receivers, conservators,
assignees, or purchasers for value.
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D'Oench does apply to the FDIC, and the FSLIC, in its receivership
capacity.' 8 9
Finally, in the late 1980s, courts began to hold that the protections of
D'Oench were available not only to the FDIC and FSLIC in their respec-
tive capacities, but also to assignees of these entities and to persons
purchasing assets from these entities.1 90 For example, D'Oench protec-
tion has been accorded to private parties who purchase notes of failed
banks acquired by the FDIC.'91 This too is logical given the fact that the
underlying justification for the D'Oench rule is illegality (i.e., public pol-
icy) and therefore third parties who are not in pari delicto should be al-
lowed to avail themselves of the rule. 92
189. See, e.g., FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that
"[t]he judicial trend has been to extend the protection afforded the FDIC under the
D'Oench doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to the FSLIC, both in its corporate capacity and
when acting as receiver for a failed institution"), superseded by statute as stated in Resolu-
tion Trust Corp. v. Ross, No. 89-1431, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14292 (E.D. La. Oct. 22,
1990); FDIC v. First Nat'l Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the
express language in D'Oench refers to receivers as well as creditors).
190. See FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47, 49-50 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying section 1823(e)
to a purchaser of assets from the FDIC); Beverly Hills Sav. v. Highfield Assocs., No.87-
259-M, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14019 (D.N.M. Aug. 28, 1987) (applying the rule of
D'Oench to a purchaser of assets from the FSLIC).
191. See Bell & Murphy & Assoc., Inc. v Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750,
754-55 (5th Cir.) ("[W]e agree with the FDIC that failure to extend D'Oench, Duhme's
protection to bridge banks would undermine the effectiveness of bridge banks as a means
of continuing the normal banking operations, and thereby protecting the depositors and
creditors, of a failed bank."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990); Porras v. Petroplex Sav.
Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1990) (extending doctrine of D'Oench to private parties
that purchased tracts of real estate); C.M.F. Va. Land, L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90, 93
(E.D. Va. 1992) (protecting private parties purchasing assets from FDIC); Federal Land
Bank v. Shaffett, 757 F. Supp. 22,23-24 (M.D. La. 1991) (stating that D'Oench extends to a
party assigned an interest in promissory notes of a failed bank); Adams v. Walker, 767 F.
Supp. 1099, 1105-06 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating that D'Oench protects transferees and assign-
ees of the FDIC); Bateman v. FDIC, 766 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (D. Me. 1991) (stating that
"bridge banks may assert the [D'Oench] doctrine as the assignees of the FDIC as the re-
ceiver of a failed institution"), rev'd, 970 F.2d 924 (1st Cir. 1992); New Maine Nat'l Bank v.
Benner, 774 F. Supp. 36, 40 (D. Me. 1991) (applying the D'Oench doctrine to "bridge
banks to collect on facially unqualified notes they have acquired from a failed bank");
Webb v. Superior Ct., 275 Cal. Rptr. 581, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (applying the D'Oench
doctrine to a private firm doing business with the FDIC), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS
994 (Cal. Feb. 28, 1991); Walsh v. New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35, 39
(Cal. Ct. App.) (holding that D'Oench applies to a private person purchasing FDIC assets),
modified, 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 1161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 1992 Cal.
LEXIS 277 (Cal. Jan. 16, 1992).
192. See supra note 82.
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b. Substantive Expansion (Holder-in-Due-Course Status)
The more dramatic expansion of D'Oench has occurred in the area of
its substantive application. D'Oench has become a "super" holder-in-
due-course statute for the federal government and now effectively pre-
cludes the assertion not only of claims or defenses based on lack of con-
sideration, but also claims or defenses based on traditional defenses such
as waiver, estoppel, laches, fraud in the inducement, usury, accord and
satisfaction, and the like.193 Beginning in the early 1970s and culminating
with the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Langley v. FDIC,94 the case
law traced three often indistinct paths: (1) cases based solely on
D'Oench;195 (2) cases based on section 1823(e); 196 and (3) cases based on
broad notions of federal common law.197
i. D'Oench Cases
Cases involving the FSLIC or the FDIC in its receivership capacity
were decided under D'Oench. In early cases, courts construed the appli-
cation of D'Oench as narrow and equitable, often turning on the culpabil-
ity of the defendant.1 98 FDIC v. Meo, 199 a typical example of early case
law, involved Meo and three associates (collectively "Meo") who con-
tracted to purchase 1000 shares of a bank's common stock.2"' To
purchase the stock, Meo executed promissory notes in favor of the
bank.2 ' The bank, however, issued and transmitted 1000 shares of voting
trust certificates in the name of the purchasers without their knowl-
193. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1988) (material altera-
tion); FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 162 (6th Cir.) (usury), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985);
FDIC v. Aroneck, 643 F.2d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 1981) (federal securities claim); RSR Proper-
ties, Inc. v. FDIC, 706 F. Supp. 524, 531-32 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (deceptive trade practices);
FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (undue influence, estoppel,
and mitigation of damages); Beighley v. FDIC, 676 F. Supp. 130, 132 (N.D. Tex. 1987)
(breach of fiduciary duty), aff'd, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989); FDIC v. MM&S Partners,
626 F. Supp. 681, 684-85 (N.D. Il. 1985) (waiver and estoppel); FDIC v. Leach, 525 F.
Supp. 1379, 1386-89 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (accord and satisfaction, laches, and usury), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 772 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. First Mortgage Investors,
485 F. Supp. 445, 453-54 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (waiver and estoppel); FDIC v. Willis, 497 F.
Supp. 272, 277-78 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (waiver, release, estoppel, and fraud).
194. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
195. See infra notes 199-232.
196. See infra notes 233-77.
197. See infra notes 278-320.
198. FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F.
Supp. 278, 281 (W.D. Okla. 1983); FDIC v. Oehlert, 252 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1977).
199. 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974).
200. Id. at 791.
201. Id.
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edge.2 °2 Unaware of what had transpired, Meo executed a new note to
evidence his debt for the balance due for his stock purchase. 20 3 When the
bank became insolvent, the FDIC was appointed receiver and sought to
enforce the outstanding note.2 4 Meo refused to pay, and the FDIC
sued.20 5 It was not until after the litigation commenced that Meo learned
that the bank did not purchase the common stock for which he
contracted.20 6
Claiming that he purchased common stock that he never received, Meo
defended his liability on the basis of a lack of consideration. 20 7 The
FDIC, relying on D'Oench, argued that Meo was estopped from raising
lack of consideration as a defense, presumably because the new promis-
sory note did not refer to the stock.20 8 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit stated that D'Oench was decided on "very
narrow grounds" and was essentially limited to accommodation note
makers who entered into secret agreements.20 9 The court stated that the
necessary predicate to D'Oench was a showing that " 'the maker lent
himself to a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority...
was or was likely to be misled.' ,210
The Meo court found that D'Oench did not apply because the note
maker was "wholly innocent" with respect to the bank's wrongful con-
duct.211 In doing so, the court relied on Justice Jackson's concurrence in
D'Oench, which stressed that the D'Oench estoppel rule had no applica-
tion " 'where ordinary and good-faith transactions are involved.' ,212
Meo is consistent with the clear rationale of D'Oench: to prevent collu-
202. Id.
203. Id. Meo and his associates became uneasy over the bank and its business affairs
and sought to cancel their debt through the sale of their stock. Id. Meo's associates were
able to sell their stock, while Meo did not. Id. Meo instead executed the new note. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 791-92. The court noted that the FDIC "argue[d] that D'Oench stands for
the broad proposition that the FDIC and the depositors it represents are protected from
losses due to reliance upon the notes of insured banks which are later subject to the claim
of some undisclosed defenses," id. at 792, and that "this broad policy applies against all
makers who are responsible for the creation and continued existence of a note." Id.
209. Id. at 792.
210. Id. (quoting D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942), super-
seded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 647 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 793 (quoting D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 474 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis
added)).
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sive arrangements between borrowers and bank officers.213 The distinc-
tion between innocent borrowers and those who could be said to be in
pari delicto with the defalcating bank officers was more clearly delineated
in FDIC v. Oehlert.214
In Oehlert, bank officers fraudulently assured an accommodation note
maker that his note would never be called due.215 The borrower exe-
cuted the note to enable a third party to borrow money from the bank.216
When the bank went into receivership, the FDIC sought to enforce the
note.217 Predictably, the maker defended his liability on the basis of a
lack of consideration.218 The Supreme Court of Iowa, applying federal
law, held that D'Oench estopped the maker from asserting lack of consid-
eration as a defense. 219 The Oehlert court expressly held that D'Oench
applied to situations where the borrower and the bank "perpetuate a
fraud on the bank's creditors, depositors and examiners" but not where
the bank perpetuates a fraud on the borrower.22 ° The court had little
trouble in reconciling the D'Oench holding with the facts of Oehlert be-
cause an " 'accommodation maker joins in the perpetuation of a scheme
which is essentially deceitful.' ,221
The fact that D'Oench clearly did not apply to situations where the
borrower was defrauded by a bank was confirmed a few years later in In
213. Id. The Court concluded:
A bona fide borrower, like Meo, is not an insurer of financial representations
of the bank with whom he conducts business. We conclude that a bank borrower
who was neither a party to any deceptive scheme involving, nor negligent with
respect to, circumstances giving rise to the claimed defense to his note is not es-
topped from asserting such defense against the bank's receiver.
Id. (footnote omitted).
214. 252 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1977).
215. Id. at 729-30.
216. Id. at 729.
217. Id. at 730.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 730, 732. The court held:
The essence of the D'Oench line of decisions is that when a person joins with a
bank in creating paper which is ostensibly valid, he will not be heard to say
against depositors, creditors, examiners, FDIC, or receivers that the paper is not
valid, notwithstanding absence of consideration, assurances of nonliability, or
fraud. The ostensible debtor is in pari delicto by his very act of aiding in mislead-
ing others.
Id. at 730-31.
220. Id. at 730. The borrower here was defrauded by the bank because the bank lied
about its intention of not calling the note due. Id. at 729. That fraud, however, was collat-
eral or tangential to the fraud the borrower intended to commit by signing a phony docu-
ment. Id. at 732. It would probably be more accurate to say that D'Oench, at least as it
was initially interpreted, was not meant to reach cases where the only defrauded party was
the borrower.
221. Id. at 732 (quoting Rainey v. Jackson, 14 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932)).
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re Longhorn Securities Litigation .222 In Longhorn Securities, the plaintiff
investors were induced to purchase interests in certain limited partner-
ships based on false and misleading representations by the bank's of-
ficers.22 3 The bank, in part, loaned money to plaintiffs to enable them to
purchase the interests.224 The loans were secured by standby letters of
credit and the bank represented to investors that the loans would be paid
out of the production income of the partnerships and their letters of
credit would be released upon such payment.225 When the partnership
failed, the bank called due the letters of credit.226 Subsequently, the bank
became insolvent and the FDIC was appointed receiver.227 The investors
alleged fraud in the inducement to relieve them of their obligations under
the letters.22s
The FDIC moved to dismiss the plaintiff-investors' complaint based on
their contention that, based on the holding in D'Oench and as successors
to the Bank, they were entitled to the notes.2 29 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, relying heavily on Jus-
tice Jackson's concurrence, held that D'Oench did not apply and denied
the FDIC's motion to dismiss.230 The court held that the plaintiffs were
the "innocent victims" of a "fraudulent scheme," and therefore could not
have been said to have "contributed to a plan to deceive" the FDIC.
231
Moreover, the court noted that plaintiff's fraud claim was based not on a
secret agreement, but on a false representation.232
222. 573 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
223. Id. at 281. These misrepresentations included "the quality and ability of partner-
ship management; the success of previous Longhorn limited partnerships; the availability
of producing wells to any partnership not generating sufficient revenue; [and] the
creditworthiness of the partnerships." Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 279.
230. Id. at 280-81 (citing D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 474 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring), superseded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d
862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982)). The court noted that:
there are four elements necessary to the assertion of D'Oench, Duhme estoppel:
(1) the FDIC must be the party against whom the claim or defense is asserted,
and (2) the party asserting the claim or defense must have lent himself (3) to a
secret agreement (4) that deceived or would tend to deceive the FDIC.
Id.
231. Id. at 281. The court drew a comparison between Longhorn Securities and FDIC
v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), asserting that like Meo, the plaintiff investor was free
of any wrongdoing and could not be estopped from arguing the lack of consideration
against the FDIC. Longhorn Securities, 573 F. Supp. at 282.
232. Longhorn Securities, 573 F. Supp. at 282.
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ii. The § 1823(e) Cases
Courts in the mid-1970s and early 1980s applied D'Oench as part of the
nebulous body of "federal common law '2 33 and limited its application to
cases where the borrower could validly have been said to have partici-
pated in a fraudulent scheme. Subsequent courts, however, deciding
cases under the statutory codification of D'Oench, section 1823(e), took a
more expansive route. The cases construed section 1823(e) as a strict lia-
bility statute2 34 that applied not only to independent side agreements (for
example, an agreement not to call a note due), but also to oral terms not
contained in written agreements.2 35
In Dasco, Inc. v. American City Bank & Trust Co., N.A. ,236 the bank
contacted plaintiffs, expressing a desire to have plaintiffs develop certain
real property for commercial and residential use.237 The bank induced
plaintiffs to purchase the property and to secure their obligations by exe-
cuting a promissory note in the amount of $1.45 million, backed addition-
ally by plaintiff's personal guarantees. 38 The parties entered into an oral
agreement that stated that, in the event the property could not be devel-
oped by a certain date, plaintiffs could merely deed the property back to
the bank, which would then cancel the notes and guarantees.2 39 Unable
to develop the property pursuant to the parties' agreed schedule, plain-
tiffs met with bank officers who informed them that the note and guaran-
tees were cancelled.24 However, plaintiffs acquiesced to the bank's
233. An example of the application of "federal common law" in this area is shown in
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982), and
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a discussion of these deci-
sions, see infra notes 278-319.
234. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 474. D'Oench could not be construed as a strict liability rule
because it is grounded on a policy of preventing arrangements that tend to deceive the
FDIC in its evaluation of the financial worth of an institution it takes over. Thus, to the
extent that the FDIC may have prior knowledge as to the existence of an oral agreement
(which might defeat or diminish its interest in an asset), D'Oench logically should not
apply (a position later cases do not take, however). Section 1823, however, makes no men-
tion of the FDIC's knowledge regarding the existence of such an agreement. The statute,
rather mechanically, merely turns on whether or not the agreement was recorded as an
official record of the bank. Thus, courts have consistently held that the FDIC's knowledge
under the statute is irrelevant. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. First Mortgage Inves-
tors, 485 F. Supp. 445, 451 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
235. Dasco, Inc. v. American City Bank & Trust Co., 429 F. Supp. 767, 770 (D. Nev.
1977).
236. 429 F. Supp. 767 (D. Nev. 1977).
237. Id. at 768.
238. Id.
239. Id. The oral agreement was not reduced to writing. Id.
240. Id.
[Vol. 43:745
A Precedent Embalms A Principle
request that title to the property remain in their names until the property
could be developed. 241
The bank became insolvent,242 and when the FDIC assumed control, it
promptly refused to recognize the cancellation of the debt instruments. 243
Plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court to resolve the issue of the
enforceability of their oral agreement.2 4  The United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, relying on section 1823(e), held that the
oral agreement was unenforceable, thereby obligating the plaintiffs to in-
demnify the bank for the $1.45 million in promissory notes and personal
guarantees. 245 Unlike an accommodation note maker, the plaintiff-bor-
rowers in Dasco did not even arguably lend themselves to a deceptive
scheme.246 The court, however, read section 1823(e) as a strict liability
statute, which allowed the FDIC to ignore any oral agreement that
tended to diminish or defeat its right or interest in an acquired asset.24 7
Similarly, in FDIC v. Vogel,248 defendants Vogel and Spitz executed
written guarantees in consideration of an oral promise by the bank to
loan the guarantors $2 million.249 The loan was never funded,25° and
when the underlying obligation went into default, the FDIC sought recov-
ery under the guarantees. 25' Defendants alleged as a defense and set-off
that their guarantees were attained in return for a promise by the bank
for the $2 million loan, and since the loan was never funded, the guaran-
tees lacked consideration.252 Since the loan was not in writing and its
enforcement would have had the effect of diminishing the FDIC's interest
241. Id. at 768-69. The bank stated that no liability would accrue to plaintiffs with
respect to the note. Id. at 769.
242. Id.
243. Id. The FDIC "refuse[d] to accept a deed to the real property and to effect cancel-
lation of the documents as per the aforementioned oral agreement, and demand[ed] pay-
ment of the principal plus interest from the plaintiffs." Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 770.
246. Id. at 769. It could be argued that by allowing themselves to remain as record title
holders, the plaintiffs participated in a deceptive scheme. However, that fact appears to be
superfluous to the court's holding. Id.
247. Id. at 770. The court concluded:
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and the case law decided thereunder allow the FDIC in its
corporate capacity to ignore oral agreements which tend to diminish or defeat its
right, title or interest in any asset acquired by it in a purchase and assumption
agreement. This law is based not on a theory of holder in due course status but,
rather, on a federal public policy protecting the institution of banking.
Id.
248. 437 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
249. Id. at 661.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 662.
252. Id.
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in the guarantees, the district court found as a matter of law that defend-
ants' lack of consideration defense was barred by section 1823(e).253
Like Dasco, Vogel did not involve an accommodation note maker or
any deceptive scheme. Vogel, however, went further than Dasco. While
Dasco merely invalidated an oral condition to an agreement, Vogel invali-
dated an entire agreement that would have negated the formation of a
contract, the creation of the guarantees.
Arguably, both cases were properly decided under a literal reading of
section 1823(e). One issue not decided by either case, however, was the
status of a fraud in the inducement defense. The statute clearly does not
confer holder-in-due-course (HDC) status on the FDIC.2 54 If the FDIC
were a HDC under section 1823(e), then the borrower could not assert
253. Id. at 663-64. The court, citing Dasco, held that section 1823 "allows the FDIC,
when it has purchased assets in its corporate capacity, to disregard oral agreements which
would diminish or defeat its interest in any asset so purchased." Id. at 663. The court
similarly disregarded the plaintiffs' assertion that section 1823 acts as a statute of frauds to
support detrimental reliance, stating that "[t]o judicially engraft an exception based on
partial performance of an oral contract with the closed bank or detrimental reliance on an
oral promise made by the closed bank is simply to ignore the clear phrasing of the statute."
Id.
254. The FDIC would not qualify for holder in due course status under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Section 3-302(3) of the Code provides that a purchaser for value is not
a holder in due course if he becomes a holder of an instrument "(a) by purchase of it at
judicial sale or by taking it under legal process; or (b) by acquiring it in taking over an
estate; or (c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in regular course of business
of the transferor." U.C.C. § 3-302(3) (1990). When the FDIC is appointed receiver and
takes over a bank, its acquisition of the bank's commercial paper is part of a bulk transac-
tion not in the ordinary course of business. See FDIC v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392, 1397
(D. Kan. 1985) ("[T]he transfer of financial instruments to the FDIC . . . is not 'in the
ordinary course of business.' Thus ... [the] FDIC would still not be a holder in due course
under [state] law." (quoting Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 872 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982)), rev'd, 856 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Webb, 464 F.
Supp. 520, 524 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). Additionally, the FDIC is not a "holder" because a
"holder" acquires an instrument through "negotiation" by indorsement, a method of acqui-
sition not used by the FDIC in its typical purchase and assumption transaction. Fred H.
Miller & Scott A. Meacham, The FDIC and Other Financial Institution Insurance Agencies
as "Super" Holders in Due Course: A Lesson in Self-Pollinated Jurisprudence, 40 OKLA. L.
REV. 621, 623 (1987); John C. Platt & Ricki S. Darby, A Primer on the Special Rights and
Immunities of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 683,
711 (1986). That the FDIC would ordinarily not be considered a holder in due course
makes sense given that a successor in interest assumes all the rights and, more importantly,
all the liabilities of the predecessor. See Third Nat'l Bank v. Hardi-Gardens Supply, Inc.,
380 F. Supp. 930, 939 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (stating that "[a] purchaser with notice of such
limitations may be a holder in due course, but he takes the instrument subject to the limita-
tion"); Pugatch v. David's Jewelers, 278 N.Y.S.2d 759, 764 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967) (stating that
"the transferee acquires no more protected interest than the transferor had").
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fraud in the inducement as a defense to his obligations under the
instrument.255
Earlier cases decided under section 1823(e) preserved the borrower's
defense of fraud in the inducement.256 FDIC v. Webb 257 is illustrative. In
Webb, defendant borrowers executed several notes in blank to secure
their purchase of stock.258 The notes were held by the bank and defend-
ants alleged that they were induced to borrow money from the bank and
execute the notes as security based on fraudulent representations by the
bank's directors regarding the solvency of the corporation whose stock
was being purchased.259 It was also defendant's understanding that the
bank would later add terms to the blank notes making the notes renewa-
ble for a ten-year period at four and one-half percent interest.260 The
bank did not execute the notes in a manner consistent with the borrow-
ers' oral authorization, and after the notes became due and the FDIC was
appointed receiver for the bank, the FDIC sought to enforce the notes.261
Defendants alleged a number of affirmative defenses to their obliga-
tions.262 Defendants asserted that based on their oral understanding, the
notes were not in default because they were renewable.263 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee rejected this
argument based on section 1823(e) because the transaction was premised
on an unrecorded oral agreement that clearly defeated the FDIC's inter-
est in the assets it acquired.26 Significantly, the court held that since the
FDIC was not a HDC, to the extent defendants could prove a defense
based on fraudulent inducement such as misrepresentations regarding the
corporation's solvency, the defense could be asserted against the FDIC to
defeat the FDIC's interest in the notes.
265
255. A HDC is only subject to real defenses such as incompetency, fraud in the factum,
illegality, and the like, but not to such personal defenses such as fraud in the inducement.
See U.C.C. § 3-305 (1990).
256. It should be noted that some courts recognized that a fraud in the inducement
defense potentially presents an exception to section 1823(e). See FDIC v. Lattimore Land
Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 146 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding a fraud in the inducement defense invalid
under Georgia law).
257. 464 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
258. Id. at 523.
259. Id. at 524.
260. Id. at 523.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 523-24.
263. Id. at 523.
264. Id. at 524. The court rejected the defendant's offer of written evidence under sec-
tion 1823(e) because "[t]he statement does not provide the specific terms of Mr. Webb's
loan nor was it executed by the bank and Mr. Webb at the time of the loan." Id. at 525.
265. Id.
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On its face, the court's holding would appear to be contradictory inas-
much as the oral agreement to fill in the terms of the notes arguably
could have also been the basis for a fraud in the inducement defense, i.e.,
promissory fraud.266 Since the procedural posture of the case involved a
summary judgment motion, a promissory fraud theory arguably
presented a material issue of fact. The court presumably made a distinc-
tion, adopted by later courts,267 between promissory and nonpromissory
misrepresentations.268 While the former falls within the scope of section
1823(e), the latter falls outside the purview of the statute. The distinction
makes at least limited sense in that promissory fraud would present a
convenient way to avoid section 1823(e). The borrower could always al-
lege that he was fraudulently induced to execute the note because of
promises made by the bank that it never intended to keep.269 Where the
misrepresentation does not imply a mutual agreement, however, section
1823(e) on its face clearly does not apply, assuming, of course, that Con-
gress did not intend to confer HDC status on the FDIC by virtue of the
statute.27°
Other federal courts, however, concluded that Congress did intend to
confer HDC status of the FDIC under section 1823(e). The same year
Webb was decided, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin in FDIC v. Rockelman ,271 held that the statute oper-
266. Promissory fraud occurs when a promise is made without an intent to perform.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529(1) (1977); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 82, § 9-919, at 365; W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 109, at 763 (5th ed. 1984); see also International Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d
1389, 1402 (8th Cir.) (determining that "a claim of promissory fraud may lie if, when the
promise was made, the promisor then had no intention to perform it"), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 345 (1993); Di Rose v. PK Management Corp., 691 F.2d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing that an individual may be liable for fraud in circumstances where she induces another
into a contract by making a promise with no intention to perform), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
915 (1983). Since a promissory fraud theory has the potential to convert every breach of
contract case into the tort of fraud, the proof requirements for promissory fraud are rather
strict. Generally, what is required is something akin to an admission. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 530 (1981); KEETON, supra, § 109, at 764-65.
267. See FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1985).
268. Id. An example of a promissory misrepresentation would be a promise to perform
a duty, in connection with the note, that the bank does not ever intend to perform. Id. A
non-promissory misrepresentation would be a false statement about an existing fact, such
as the financial solvency of an institution. Id.
269. The opposing argument is that, given the tough evidentiary standard the plaintiff
must meet, there is no need to not exclude promissory fraud from the reach of § 1823(e).
270. Nothing in the legislative history indicates this was Congress' intent. See supra
notes 163-71.
271. 460 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Wis. 1978). Rockelman involved the purchase of bank
stock by defendant based on information provided by his neighbor, an officer at the bank,
regarding the need for the bank to raise capital. Id. at 1000. After the purchase, defendant
executed a renewal note with the understanding that the proceeds of the note went to-
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ated to grant the FDIC the benefits of HDC status that it would
otherwise lack.272 The court's conclusion was not based on any statutory
authority, case law, or legislative history. The court also held that a fraud
in the inducement theory was not valid against the FDIC, although it
technically had no status as an HDC.27 3 The fraud theory in Rockelman
was not premised on an alleged oral agreement, but rather on representa-
tions made to the plaintiff with regard to the value of the corporate stock
purchased.274
Two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit in FDIC v. Lauterbach275 affirmed a district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the FDIC in response to a challenge by defendants
based on a fraud in the inducement theory.276 The Sixth Circuit held that
section 1823(e) "clothed the FDIC ... with the same protection from the
defense of fraud in the inducement accorded a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument.
277
iii. Gunter v. Hutcheson
By the early 1980s, the scope and breadth of D'Oench and section
1823(e) was somewhat muddled. The cases interpreting section 1823(e)
seemingly loosened D'Oench from its equitable moorings by premising
liability on a mechanistic view of the statute. Moreover, the section
1823(e) cases, or at least the trend of those cases, created a super HDC
status in the FDIC in the absence of statutory authority or legislative his-
wards the discharge of the debt from the original stock purchase. Id. at 1001. When the
bank failed and the FDIC as receiver sought to enforce the note, defendant alleged fraud
in the original purchase based on failure of consideration and failure to disclose material
information. Id.
272. The court observed:
[A]lthough the FDIC, in its corporate capacity, is not a holder in due course
within the meaning of that term under the Uniform Commercial Code, Congress
intended by means of section 1823 to clothe the Corporation with the protections
afforded a holder in due course and shield the Corporation against many defenses
that would otherwise be available.
Id. at 1003.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1000.
275. 626 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir. 1980).
276. Id. at 1338.
277. Id. at 1330 (footnote omitted); see also FDIC v. Rosenthal, 477 F. Supp. 1223, 1226
(E.D. Wis. 1979), aff'd mem., 631 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1980); FDIC v. Balistreri, 470 F. Supp.
752, 756 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (holding that only defenses involving fraud in the factum are
available against the FDIC in its corporate capacity); FDIC v. Hanrahan, No. 76-C-594
(E.D. Wis. Jan. 8, 1979) (denying application to intervene as of right because not timely
made under the Federal Rules), aff'd, 612 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1980); FDIC v. James T.
Barry Co., 453 F. Supp. 81, 83 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (holding the FDIC to be insulated from any
claims that defendant had against the bank).
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tory. In 1982, these two lines of case law spawned a third, with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in
Gunter v. Hutcheson.278
In December 1974, the Gunters purchased the majority of the out-
standing common stock of a bank for $5.5 million, securing their obliga-
tion by signing two promissory notes.2 79 The Bank induced them to
purchase the stock by fraudulent representations of the bank's officers
concerning future actions of the bank and the bank's financial condi-
tion.28° Two months later, the FDIC declared the bank insolvent and was
appointed receiver. 28 1 The Gunters sued the bank's former officers and
directors for fraud, seeking to rescind the promissory notes now held by
the FDIC.28 2 The FDIC, in turn, counter-claimed for payment under the
notes.283
The FDIC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Gunters'
claims were barred by both section 1823 and federal common law.2  The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court and granted the summary
judgment motion.285 However, the court of appeals did not find that the
FDIC was protected by either section 1823 or the federal common law of
D'Oench.286
The court first considered the Gunters' claims in light of section
1823(e). 287 Although certain alleged misrepresentations such as a prom-
ise by the bank to defer interest payments on the notes were based upon
agreements between the parties, other alleged misrepresentations such as
representations concerning the financial condition of the bank could not
arguably have been claimed to be "agreements., 288 The court implicitly
distinguished between promissory representations and non-promissory
representations, with the latter falling outside the scope of section
1823(e). 289 The court adopted a rather strict interpretation of "agree-
ment" under the statute, and contrasted it with a claim of fraudulent in-
278. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
279. Id. at 866.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 877.
286. Id. at 871-73.
287. Id. at 866-67.
288. Id. at 867.
289. Id.
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ducement, which negates the existence of an agreement. 290 For this
reason, the court concluded that section 1823(e) did not apply.29'
Instead of relying on section 1823(e) or D'Oench, the Gunter court
relied on broad principles of federal common law to fashion a rule that
protected the FDIC from ordinary fraud claims.292 The court placed
heavy emphasis upon the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc. 293 Kimbell, which was not decided under D'Oench,
held that to determine when and how to fashion an applicable rule of
federal common law, a court must engage in a two-step process.294 First,
the court must decide whether federal law is at all applicable.295 Second,
the court then must fashion the contours of a uniform rule of federal
common law by balancing three factors: "[w~hether the federal program
was one which by its nature required nationwide uniformity, whether
adopting the state law would frustrate the specific objectives of the fed-
eral program, and whether applying a federal rule would disrupt commer-
cial relations predicated on state law." 2
96
In Gunter, the first part of the analysis-determining whether federal
law applies-was simple: In D'Oench, the Supreme Court created a fed-
eral common law rule to administer the national banking system.297
Thus, federal law governed.298 Next, the issue for the court was whether
a new uniform rule should be created.299 The court concluded that uni-
290. See id. The court's reasoning, essentially holding that only non-promissory repre-
sentations are outside the scope of the statute, is under-inclusive. Presumably, the court
reached this holding because the non-promissory misrepresentations would have under-
mined the formation of the contract. However, promissory misrepresentation may be the
basis of a just contract formation defense as easily as a non-promissory misrepresentation.
The only difference between the two is the standard of proof required for making out a
prima facie case.
291. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 867.
292. Id. at 871-73.
293. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
294. Id. at 726-29.
295. Id. at 726. The Court noted that "[wihen Government activities '[arise] from and
[bear] heavily upon a federal ... program,' the Constitution and Acts of Congress "'re-
quire" otherwise than state law govern of its own force.'" Id. at 726-27 (quoting United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973) (alterations in original)).
296. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 868. "Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide
federal rule is a matter of judicial policy 'dependent upon a variety of considerations al-
ways relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon
them of applying state law.'" Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947)).
297. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 869.
298. Id. The court's holding was derived from the fact that "the FDIC operates under
authority derived from a specific statutory scheme passed by Congress in exercise of a
'constitutional function of power' to protect and stabilize the banking industry." Id.
299. Id.
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formity was necessary based on the factors outlined in Kimbell.300 The
court reasoned that because of the nature of the FDIC, a uniform rule
was required because of the FDIC's prevalence in insuring banks
throughout the nation and because of the necessity of the FDIC to make
overnight decisions when dealing with failed banks. 301 The court con-
cluded that in the absence of a nonliability rule for fraud, the FDIC's
statutory mandate would be frustrated. 3 2 The Gunter court felt that to
allow a borrower to allege fraud in the inducement, even where based on
a nonpromissory representation, and to escape liability would provide a
back door to avoid the strictures of section 1823(e).3 °3
The Gunter court concluded by fashioning the following rule:
Accordingly, we hold that as a matter of federal common law,
the FDIC has a complete defense to state and common law
fraud claims on a note acquired by the FDIC in the execution of
a purchase and assumption transaction, for value, in good faith,
and without actual knowledge of the fraud at the time the FDIC
entered into the purchase and assumption agreement. 30 4
Gunter essentially created super-HDC status for the FDIC. Unlike
Rockelman, Gunter did not rely on legal sophistry by holding that Con-
gress intended to confer HDC status on the FDIC in section 1823(e).
Rather, the Gunter court perceived its holding as merely a logical exten-
sion of D'Oench.3 °5 Presumably, the rationale for Gunter's rule was to
300. Id.
301. Id. The court felt that:
decisions concerning the appropriate method of dealing with a bank failure must
be made with extraordinary speed if the going concern value of the failed institu-
tion is to be preserved. Subjecting the FDIC to the additional burden of consid-
ering the impact of possibly variable state law on the rights involved could
significantly impair the FDIC's ability to choose between the liquidation and
purchase-and-assumption alternatives in handling bank failure.
Id.
302. Id. at 869-70. The court observed that "[i]f the FDIC's right to collect on returned
assets, however, were subject to fraud claims of which the FDIC lacked knowledge, esti-
mating its potential loss from a purchase would be impossible." Id. at 870.
303. Id. The court noted:
[I]f an obligor could assert that the failure of a bank to perform certain promises
constituted fraud and grounds for rescission, the obligor would successfully
thwart the "no agreement" protection of § 1823(e) "by asserting as fraudulent the
same unwritten agreement of which a breach . . .may not under § 1823(e) be
asserted against the FDIC."
Id. at 871-72 (quoting FDIC v. Lattimore Land Co., 656 F.2d 139, 146 n.13 (5th Cir. 1981)
(omission in original)).
304. Id. at 873.
305. Id. at 872 n.14. The court observed that D'Oench and Deitrick v. Greaney, 309
U.S. 190 (1940), "chronicle a broadening protection for the FDIC founded on federal poli-
[Vol. 43:745
A Precedent Embalms A Principle
facilitate purchase and assumption transactions30 6 by the FDIC by al-
lowing it to rely on the face value of the commercial paper of the
institution.3 °7
Post-Gunter case law confirms that courts generally interpret Gunter as
creating HDC status for the FDIC.308 In FDIC v. Galloway,30 9 bank of-
ficers induced the defendant to execute a guarantee by misrepresenting
the creditworthiness of the original obligor.31 0 When the FDIC assumed
control, it sought to enforce the guarantees.1 The Galloway court noted
that the FDIC was a HDC by virtue of federal common law developed in
cases such as Gunter.312  However, the court's interpretation of the
cies of protecting the banking system, and we think support our federal common law hold-
ing." Id.
306. See Gunter, 674 F.2d at 869-70. As an insurer of a bank, the FDIC's primary duty
upon failure of a bank is to pay bank depositors up to the insured amount. There are two
ways the FDIC may go about this. First, it may liquidate the assets of the bank, paying
amounts recouped to depositors, and making up any shortfall from its insurance fund. The
major disadvantage with this, of course, is that the significant disruption in the bank's activ-
ity is not the best way of promoting public confidence in the banking system. No one likes
to see a bank close its doors. A second and preferred method employed by the FDIC is a
"purchase and assumption" transaction, whereby the FDIC attempts to arrange for an-
other bank to purchase the failed bank and to reopen it without any interruption in its
operations. In purchase and assumption transactions the FDIC typically wears two hats: it
is appointed receiver for the failed institution and the receiver assigns to the FDIC (in its
corporate capacity) the assets of the institution, with the corporation working out the
purchase and assumption transaction with another bank. For a good discussion regarding
the mechanics and utility of purchase and assumption transactions, see Kevin J. Foley,
Note, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Wood: The FDIC, The Failed Bank, and
the Seemingly Insurmountable Presumption, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 693,696-98 (1986); Platt &
Darby, supra note 254, at 686-92.
307. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 870. The Gunter court noted:
[Tihe FDIC must have some method to evaluate is potential liability in a
purchase and assumption versus its potential liability from a liquidation. Because
of the time constraints involved, the only method of evaluating potential loss
open to the FDIC is relying on the books and records of the failed bank to esti-
mate what assets would be returned by a purchasing bank and to estimate which
of those assets ultimately would be collectible.
Id.
308. Gunter did not strictly hold that the rule it created was synonymous with HDC
status. One subsequently decided case cited Gunter as expressly holding that under federal
common law the FDIC is a HDC. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 944 (1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in
Wood that when the FDIC (in its corporate capacity) acquires assets as part of a purchase
and assumption transaction, it takes all the commercial paper as a HDC. Id. Accordingly,
the FDIC was immune from a usury defense and also had no duty to investigate, privileges
normally accorded to HDCs. Id. at 161-62.
309. 613 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Kan. 1985), rev'd, 856 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1988).
310. Id. at 1396-97.
311. Id. at 1396.
312. Id. at 1397. Moreover, section 1823(e) and D'Oench arguably did not apply since
the guarantors obligation was not premised on an "agreement." Id. at 1403.
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Gunter line of authority was narrow. The court, in essence, construed the
new federal common law rule to confer on the FDIC rights no greater
than a HDC.31 3 Thus, since HDC status only attaches to holders of nego-
tiable instruments and a guarantee is not a negotiable instrument,314 the
FDIC was subject to the guarantors' fraud in the inducement defense. 15
Of course, the reasoning of Gunter was broad enough to confer on the
FDIC a status greater than that of an ordinary HDC. Gunter was based
on a new rule created under the Kimbell analysis, with an eye toward
facilitating FDIC purchase and assumption transactions. 316 Because the
FDIC upon assumption of a bank inherits much more than negotiable
instruments, which it may attempt to sell in bulk to an acquiring bank, to
be consistent with Gunter a court should confer HDC status, or "super"
HDC status, on the FDIC for all assets it receives. Some courts have
followed this rationale to confer such broad power on the FDIC.3 17 Simi-
lar to Gunter itself, the post-Gunter cases all arose in a context in which
section 1823(e)-which in many respects evinces a much broader policy
than D'Oench-was potentially applicable.3" 8 By 1986, the case law ex-
313. Id. at 1401-02. The court analyzed the Supreme Court's holding in Kimbell Foods
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision in FDIC v. Gulf
Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984), to determine the FDIC's rights against non-
negotiable instruments. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. at 1401. While Gulf Life held that the
FDIC could obtain holder in due course status for non-negotiable instruments, Gulf Life,
737 F.2d at 1517-18, the Galloway court felt that such an extension "underestimated the
extent to which its results dashes the [holder of the non-negotiable instrument]'s commer-
cial expectation." Galloway, 613 F. Supp. at 1402. The Galloway court suggested an alter-
native view, "separat[ing] a failed bank's financial instruments into negotiable and non-
negotiable instruments." Id.
314. Generally, guarantees are not negotiable instruments since they do not contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a)
(1990).
315. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. at 1402. The court held that "[w]here non-negotiable in-
struments are obtained by the FDIC, then, we would 'decline to override intricate state
laws of general applicability on which private creditors base their daily transactions.' " Id.
(quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979)).
316. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 868-70 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982).
317. In Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.
1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the federal
common law rule created in Gunter extended to non-negotiable instruments, such as insur-
ance policies. Id. at 1517.
318. See, e.g., FDIC v. Burger, 631 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D. Kan. 1986) (holding that
section 1823 is broader in its protection of the FDIC than D'Oench); FDIC v. Vestring, 620
F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D. Kan. 1985) (holding that section 1823 bars any affirmative defense
against the FDIC that results from an oral agreement).
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panded to such an extent that D'Oench itself was perceived as creating
HDC status.319
The case law in the lower courts from 1942 to 1986 can be viewed as a
continuous expansion of D'Oench from a prophylactic rule based on ille-
gality to one based on public policy. Specifically, the focus of the rule has
shifted from the "deceptive scheme" to ways of facilitating bank take-
overs.3 2 ° The United States Supreme Court did not revisit D'Oench
again until 1987.
c. Langley v. FDIC
321
The Langleys borrowed money from the bank in order to purchase cer-
tain real property owned by the bank.3 22 The Langleys' purchase was
secured by a note, collateral mortgage, and personal guarantees.32 3 The
bank made material misrepresentations to the Langleys concerning the
acreage, mineral deposits, and encumbrances on the land.32a No refer-
ence to the alleged misrepresentations, however, appeared on any of the
transaction documents.325 When the Langleys defaulted on their note
and the bank sued, 26 the Langleys defended on the grounds of fraud in
the inducement.327 Unfortunately, while the suit was still pending, the
bank became insolvent, and the FDIC was appointed receiver and be-
came plaintiff in the suit.3 28 The district court granted summary judg-
319. In Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1986), sec-
tion 1823(e) by its express terms was inapplicable because the FSLIC, and not the FDIC,
was a party to the suit. Id. at 1338. In Hsi, defendants alleged that the S&L'induced them
to execute promissory notes by failing to disclose certain details concerning the weak fi-
nancial condition of the company whose securities were purchased. Id. at 1335. The
FSLIC subsequently took over the S&L and sought to enforce the notes, arguing that it
was a HDC or, alternatively, that it was protected from such defenses under D'Oench. Id.
The Hsi court held that under normal common law principles of commercial law the
FSLIC was not a HDC because of its bulk acquisition. Id. at 1336-37. However, under
D'Oench and based on the principles of section 1823 (which the court interpreted as codi-
fying D'Oench), the court in essence conferred super HDC on the FSLIC by holding that it
was immune to a fraud in the inducement defense. Id. at 1338.
320. See supra notes 193-319 and accompanying text.
321. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
322. Id. at 88.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 89.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 88.
327. Id. at 88-90.
328. Id. at 89.
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ment in favor of the FDIC,3 29 and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment.33 °
Before the Supreme Court, the Langleys argued that the lower court
erred in concluding that their defense was barred under section
1823(e).33 1 They argued that since no "agreement" existed, section
1823(e) did not apply.332 The Court confronted the narrow issue of the
interpretation of the word "agreement" contained in section 1823(e).3 33
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, chose the most narrow
fashion to decide the issue. 334 The Court's opinion did not enunciate any
rule of federal common law, nor did it examine the legislative history to
interpret the statute.335 Instead, in line with Justice Scalia's judicial phi-
losophy, the Court's opinion concentrated exclusively on the plain mean-
ing of the words in section 1823(e) to resolve the issue.3 36 Justice Scalia's
statutory interpretation was facile. Citing contract treatises, he noted that
the word "agreement," in the normal contract sense, encompasses not
only promises but conditions, and warranties regarding land are consid-
ered conditions to performance. 337 Thus, "agreement" as used in section
1823(e) encompasses not only unrecorded promises but also unrecorded
representations and warranties.338 Section 1823(e) therefore barred the
Langleys' fraud in the inducement defense.3 39
Justice Scalia's argument, of course, is syllogistic. Whether a term of an
agreement, either a promise or condition,34 ° constitutes the agreement is
a secondary question because it presupposes that an agreement in fact
exists. The threshold question is whether there was an agreement in the
329. Planters Trust & Sav. Bank v. Langley, 615 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La. 1985), aff'd,
FDIC v. Langley, 792 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 484 U.S. 86 (1986).
330. FDIC v. Langley, 792 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 484 U.S. 86 (1986).
331. Langley, 484 U.S. at 90.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See generally id. at 91-95.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 91. Justice Scalia noted that "[i]t seems to us that this common meaning of
the word 'agreement' must be assigned to its usage in § 1823(e) if that section is to fulfill its
intended purposes." Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 93.
340. Moreover, the condition of which Justice Scalia speaks is not considered a "true"
or express condition of the contract. At most, the truth of a warranty is a constructive
condition precedent (imposed by the court) to performance. See CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 82, § 11-8, at 444-45; FARNSWORTH, supra note 82, § 8.9, at 576-82. Construc-
tive conditions are more legal fiction than the subject matter of an actual agreement.
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first place.34' If A and B agree that A will convey 100 acres to B, it is
indisputable that 100 acres is part of the agreement since there is a mutu-
ality of intention.342 If, however, A lies and tells B that he is conveying
100 acres which B readily accepts, but in fact only conveys 50 acres, it is
difficult to see how the parties mutually "agreed" to the conveyance of
100 acres when A had no such intention.343
In reaching his conclusion that section 1823(e) applied to representa-
tions as well as promises, Justice Scalia curiously relied on D'Oench.
344
Justice Scalia believed that, if a condition in a note is unrecorded, it ren-
ders the note or part of the note a "secret agreement" (in the D'Oench
sense of the term), and the borrower, by executing the note, is lending
himself to a "scheme," whereby a banking authority might be misled.345
Justice Scalia's reasoning, like most of the post D'Oench jurisprudence,
latches onto the language of D'Oench like a talisman, ignoring the actual
facts of D'Oench.346 D'Oench involved an actual agreement between a
bank officer and borrower that by its very nature was deceptive.347 In
that case, the borrower knowingly agreed to sign a piece of paper in the
form of an accommodation note that he knew did not mean what it said,
as it was not intended to constitute a valid obligation.348 This is a far cry
from the situation where a borrower is induced to sign a note based on a
material misrepresentation concerning value.
341. Analytically, the question of contract formation and contract interpretation are
separate issues, with the former preceding the latter. Contract formation is based on an
offer, an acceptance and the recitation of valid mutual considerations (at least for bilateral
contracts). In the absence of any of these requirements-which are based on the notion of
mutual assent-no contract ordinarily exists. If there is no contract it obviously follows
that one cannot reach the issue with regard to the terms of the contract (i.e., the promises
and conditions).
342. See supra note 341.
343. See supra note 341.
344. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 92 (1987).
345. Id. at 92-93. Justice Scalia concluded:
We can safely assume that Congress did not mean "agreement" in § 1823(e) to be
interpreted so much more narrowly than its permissible meaning as to disserve
the principle of [D'Oench] applying that term to FDIC-acquired notes. Certainly,
one who signs a facially unqualified note subject to an unwritten and unrecorded
condition upon its repayment has lent himself to a scheme or arrangement that is
likely to mislead the banking authorities, whether the condition consists of per-
formance of a counterpromise (as in D'Oench, Duhme) or of the truthfulness of a
warranted fact.
Id.
346. Id. at 92.
347. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 454 (1942), superseded by statute
as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
348. Id.
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Langley served to unshackle the more recent D'Oench authority from
the constraints of a more common sense interpretation of section 1823(e)
and from the constraints of the Gunter-created HDC analogy. Since sec-
tion 1823(e) seemingly applies to any unrecorded statement tending to
defeat or diminish the FDIC's interest in any asset it acquires, the distinc-
tion between promises and misrepresentations is meaningless. 34 9 Thus,
any representation, so long as it is unrecorded as an official record of the
institution, is a nullity.350
Moreover, given the breadth of this interpretation of section 1823(e),
the Gunter rule is superfluous. That is, Gunter and its progeny created a
rule of federal common law because of a perceived void in section
1823(e): its inapplicability to non-promissory representations. 351 Because
of the Langley decision, it is unnecessary to resort to the new federal
common law rule; the statute will do the trick.352 The federal common
law rule, which sought to carve out a new HDC status for the FDIC,
therefore becomes superfluous and under-inclusive. Because the HDC
analogy may no longer be drawn and section 1823(e) on its face applies to
any "asset" acquired by the FDIC, the distinction between negotiable and
non-negotiable instruments becomes irrelevant. In effect, Langley pro-
duced a more expansive application of D'Oench.
d. Post-Langley Case Law
The case law since Langley continues the expansion of D'Oench. The
FDIC and the FSLIC are now clothed in impenetrable armor shielding it
from defenses not only based on lack of consideration and fraud in the
inducement (promissory and non-promissory), but also estoppel, waiver,
usury, and the like.353 The penumbra of D'Oench and its progeny en-
compasses negotiable and non-negotiable instruments.354 D'Oench ap-
plies in a context where there is no arguable agreement: in the context of
an intentional misrepresentation. D'Oench bars not only defenses to ob-
ligations, but also affirmative claims: "The [D'Oench] doctrine has been
expanded to encompass any claim against an insolvent institution that
349. Langley, 484 U.S. at 92-93.
350. Id. at 91-92. The court felt the rationale for such a requirement was "to allow
federal and state bank examiners to rely on a bank's records in evaluating the worth of the
bank's assets." Id. at 91.
351. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
352. Langley, 484 U.S. at 95. The Court noted that "[tihe short of the matter is that
Congress opted for the certainty of the requirements set forth in § 1823(e). An agreement
that meets them prevails even if the FDIC did not know of it; and an agreement that does
not meet them fails even if the FDIC knew." Id.
353. See supra note 193.
354. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43:745
A Precedent Embalms A Principle
would either diminish the value of the assets held by the FSLIC [or
FDIC] or increase the liabilities of the insolvent institution. ' 355 D'Oench
applies even where the FDIC or the FSLIC inherit no outstanding asset.
Courts routinely cite D'Oench and section 1823(e) in affirming judg-
ments in favor of the FDIC, and have done so literally hundreds of times
within the past several years.356 D'Oench has been described as a "once-
little-used doctrine ... applied to nearly every major S&L failure as myr-
iad borrowers try to get out from under their debts." '35 7 Mechanically,
the further expansion of D'Oench has been accomplished by the merger
of the D'Oench doctrine with section 1823(e) jurisprudence, including
Langley and Gunter.35 s Whereas before three connected but independ-
ent lines of authority existed, courts today treat analytically distinct fac-
tual scenarios in an identical manner. Even if a court differentiates a case
based on its facts, the three lines of authority have broadened so signifi-
cantly that the distinctions are meaningless as courts will employ one doc-
trine/rule as an alternative to another. If section 1823(e) does not apply,
D'Oench will, and if D'Oench does not, Gunter will. D'Oench and its
progeny have become a seamless web.
The merger of D'Oench, section 1823(e) and Gunter is reflected in nu-
merous judicial decisions. In FSLIC v. Gordy,35 9 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's judgment in
favor of the FSLIC based on D'Oench.360 S&L officers made statements
misrepresenting the S&L's financial condition to the borrowers, 361 and
because the FSLIC was a party, section 1823(e) did not expressly apply
and Langley was therefore seemingly inapposite.362 Moreover, because
the representations were nonpromissory, it would have been difficult to
see where there existed any "secret agreement., 363 The court nonethe-
355. Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Sav. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 671 (D. Utah
1989), aff'd, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
356. For example, between November 1992 and June 1993, D'Oench and/or section
1823 was cited in 147 reported federal and state decisions. Search of LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Mega file (July 1, 1993).
357. Sherry R. Sontag, To Thrift Fraud Victims, Government Says 'Tough Luck', NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 24, 1990, at 3.
358. This has been largely accomplished on the strength of Justice Scalia's opinion in
Langley where he bizarrely cites D'Oench as supporting his strained interpretation of
§ 1823. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 92-93 (1989). The post-Langley jurisprudence
around the country has by and large interpreted Langley as indistinguishable from
D'Oench for this reason. See, e.g, FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1991)
(noting the relationship between the D'Oench and Langley decisions).
359. 928 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991).
360. Id. at 1568.
361. Id. at 1560.
362. Id. at 1560-61.
363. Id. at 1561.
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less held that Langley compelled the result that the defendant guarantee
makers were estopped from asserting a fraud in the inducement de-
fense.364 The court relied heavily on FDIC v. McCullough,365 which,
although citing Langley, was actually a post-Gunter HDC case.3 66 The
Gordy court made no effort to distinguish section 1823 from D'Oench.367
The importance of cases such as Gordy lies in the broadening of
D'Oench so that the "secret agreement" element is no longer required
for the application of the doctrine. 368 Anything falling short of fraud in
the factum is now barred under D'Oench.3 69 D'Oench applies as long as
the borrower's defense or claim is based on something outside of the
bank's records.370 Even where courts hold that section 1823(e) does not
expressly apply, D'Oench and Gunter exist as fallback positions. Thus, in
364. Id. at 1563. The court stated "[blecause the alleged condition of repayment pursu-
ant to the guaranties-the truth of [the banki's financial statement, an agreement under
Langley-was unrecorded and thus not manifest as required by [FDIC v. McCullough, 911
F.2d 593 (11th Cir. 1990)], appellants 'lent [themselves] to a scheme or arrangement that is
likely to mislead the banking authorities.'" Id. at 1564 (quoting Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S.
93 (1987) (citations omitted)).
365. 911 F.2d 593 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
366. Id. at 600, 603. For another case in which Gunter and its progeny survive, see
Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990) (relying heavily on another
post-Gunter case, FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985)).
367. Some courts acknowledge that section 1823(e) literally does not apply to the
FSLIC, although it can be used by analogy. See Firstsouth, F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858
F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that section 1823(e) may apply to the FSLIC by
analogy in order to prevent a party from escaping liability for a facially valid note by as-
serting an oral side agreement as a defense). Other courts are more direct in applying
section 1823 even where it literally is inapposite. See In re Century Cntr. Partners Ltd. v.
FDIC, No. 91-55439, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28757, at *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1992) (holding
that D'Oench applies to protect a federal insurer from the result of side agreements that
were not reported to bank examiners); Weber v. New W. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 468, 472-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that, while section 1823(e) only applies
in situations involving the FDIC acting as a corporate entity, the D'Oench doctrine estops
the enforcement of side agreement between failed financial institution and borrower where
enforcement after agreement would diminish the value of the institution's assets or in-
crease its liabilities).
368. See Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1527 (5th Cir. 1990) (relying on Langley as
evidence that "[s]ince the initial statement of the doctrine in D'Oench, Duhme, the Court
has expanded the preclusive effect well beyond the content of an oral 'secret agreement'
between the bank and the borrower"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991).
369. See FSLIC v. T.F. Stone-Liberty Land Ass'n, 787 S.W.2d 475, 491 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (assessing that fraud in the inducement claims are barred by D'Oench and Langley).
370. As one court stated:
In fact, however, D'Oench, Duhme is not limited only to "secret" agreements.
It applies whenever there is an understanding "outside the bank's records."
Neither is an actual "scheme" required, insofar as that word connotes something
fraudulent and underhanded. "All that is relevant is that the agreements are not
in the [bank's] files." . . . In short... "lack of bad faith, recklessness, or even
negligence" is simply "not a defense in D'Oench cases."
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Hall v. FDIC,371 even though section 1823(e) did not apply because the
FDIC did not retain an interest in any asset, D'Oench applied to defeat
the borrower's defenses. 372 In FDIC v. McCullough373 and FSLIC v.
Murray,374 although the statute applied in neither case because the
FSLIC was a party, the FSLIC prevailed in both because of its status as
an HDC.
37 5
The expansion of D'Oench has led to a number of egregiously inequita-
ble results.376 In light of recent extension of D'Oench, Bartram v.
In re Woodstone Ltd. Partnership, 149 B.R. 294, 297 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (alteration in
original) (quoting FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 698 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1163 (1992); Baumann v. Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1516 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992)).
371. 920 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1231 (1991).
372. Id. at 338-40.
373. 911 F.2d 593 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
374. 853 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1988).
375. McCullough, 911 F.2d at 600; Murray, 853 F.2d at 1256. The Murray court ob-
served that "the sensitive federal interests implicated when FSLIC rescues an insolvent
savings and loan lead us to conclude that FSLIC should enjoy at least holder in due course
status as a matter of federal common law." Id.
376. In FDIC v. Kasal, 913 F.2d 487 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1990), a
borrower was estopped from asserting payment as a defense to a note obligation where the
payment was made to a bank employee who misappropriate the funds. Id. at 488. The
court conceded that the result was "harsh," but felt it had no choice given the evolution of
case law under D'Oench. Id. at 490-91.
In Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991),
a borrower was estopped from asserting against the FDIC's purchaser of assets a claim
under the federal securities laws of which the FDIC was aware at the time of acquisition.
Id. at 1525-26. Judge Brown in dissent posed the following semi-rhetorical question:
The question is whether the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and it's [sic] so-called
codified counterpart, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), estop all defenses to the repayment of
loans of failed banks which the FDIC has assumed in receivership. Is the doctrine
so powerful and all encompassing that nothing can stand in its way, including
federal statutes protecting investors?
Id. at 1529-30 (Brown, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
In FDIC v. Texarkana Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1043 (1990), a bank that innocently participated in a document loan participation, but not
the underlying deceptive transaction, could not claim a set-off based on D'Oench and
Langley. Id. at 267-68. In essence, the court held that a completely innocent bank is re-
sponsible for the concealed fraud of another.
In FSLIC v. T.F. Stone-Liberty Land Assocs., 787 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), a
judgment creditor's claim was defeated because D'Oench applies to claims already adjudi-
cated, even where the FSLIC is aware of the judgment and merely is appointed receiver
after the trial. Id. at 481-85.
In McCullough v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 870 (1st Cir. 1993), borrowers who brought an action
based on a bank's failure to disclose material facts, in violation of a statutory requirement,
were estopped from asserting the claims against the FDIC based on Langley. Id. at 872-74.
This holding represents Langley at its most illogical and absurd, as the McCullough court
essentially held that a non-disclosure constituted an "agreement."
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FDIC,377 cited at the beginning of this Article, is neither extraordinary
nor unusual. Bartram exemplifies the current application of the D'Oench
doctrine. Because the FSLIC and not the FDIC was the original party to
the dispute, section 1823(e) did not apply. Bartram presented a straight-
forward case of fraud in the inducement supported by fairly compelling
evidence.378 Moreover, the plaintiffs in Bartram were not defending their
liability on an outstanding note, but were suing in tort for fraud as gen-
eral creditors.379
Had Bartram been decided one day or a number of years after the
D'Oench decision, it would be difficult to see how D'Oench would apply.
Fifty years after D'Oench and its expansion, Bartram became an easy
case, falling squarely within the jurisprudence of post-D'Oench case
law.38° The Bartram court had no trouble concluding that plaintiffs'
fraud cause of action was barred by D'Oench.381
D. Deregulation
1. Portfolio Diversification: The Federal Response
a. Initial Responses
A funny thing happened on the way to the expansion of D'Oench: the
S&L industry was deregulated. The S&L industry was originally designed
to allow people in local communities to purchase their own homes.382 A
S&L typically made a low rate mortgage loan available to a local resident
in consideration of the acceptance of his savings held in a passbook ac-
count. 383 The system of long-term mortgages financed by short-term de-
posits served the industry well for the first thirty years. During this
period, roughly from the Great Depression to the mid-1960s, the industry
prospered because interest rates were stable.384
377. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2115
(Cal. Feb. 27, 1992).
378. Almost immediately after the S&L promised to build on the land it was acquiring,
it turned around and resold the property. Id. at 615.
379. Id. There was no outstanding note because the FSLIC fully obtained its recourse
by foreclosing on the collateral. Id.
380. See Lawrence J. White, The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S62 (1991).
381. Bartram, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
382. JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 8-9 (1991). "The
[savings and loan] institution economized on information and transactions costs by consoli-
dating the savings of a group of local individuals and rechanneling the funds to the same
individuals in the form of home mortgage loans." Id. at 10.
383. Id. at 9-10.
384. Id. at 17-23.
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Interest rates began to rise during the mid-1960s as the nation stepped
up spending for the Vietnam War.385 Because S&L portfolios had been
traditionally restricted to long-term, fixed-rate mortgages financed by
short-term deposits, the industry was subject to a "maturity gap" as inter-
est rates rose.386 Consequently, in 1966 Congress passed legislation387
which placed a ceiling on the interest rates that S&Ls could pay on depos-
its. 388 The act solved interest rate squeeze problems during the remain-
der of the 1960s and most of the 1970s.
b. DIDMCA and Garn-St Germain
In the 1970s, interest rates began to soar dramatically. 389 Unable to
diversify their portfolios, S&Ls experienced a serious financial crunch as
their cost of funds exceeded the rate of return from their long-term as-
sets.390 The perceived portfolio diversification problem caused a regula-
tory reaction.391 If only S&Ls could be allowed to invest in shorter-term,
higher-return investments, the "maturity gap" would theoretically
disappear. 3
92
By the end of 1979, the S&L industry was suffering from heavy
losses. 3 9 3 Congress reacted to the financial troubles of the S&Ls with
passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980 (DIDMCA)394 and the Garn-St Germain Depository In-
385. WHITE, supra note 38, at 62. From 1964 to 1966 interest rates rose from approxi-
mately 3.5% to 5.0%. See id.
386. Id. The "maturity gap" is also known as the problem of "borrowing short and
lending long." An S&L derives its income from its investments in long-term, fixed-rate
mortgages. BARTH, supra note 382, at 10. These mortgages, because of their duration,
only marginally respond to changes in the market rate of interest. An S&L's liabilities (or
its cost of funds) derive from the short-term passbook deposits it holds. Id. These short-
term liabilities are exceedingly sensitive to the market rate of interest. WHITE, supra note
38, at 61. As interest rates rise, this normally creates an imbalance between an S&L's
assets and liabilities: the assets (long-term mortgages) are locked into a lower rate while
the costs (interest paid on passbook accounts) rise. Id. at 61-62. Therefore, an S&L is
placed in a precarious position regardless of what it does. If it raises the interest payable
on its short-term liabilities to compete with the market, it will operate at a loss, but if it
does not increase its interest rates, it will lose depositors. Id.
387. Act of Sept. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823.
388. Id. § 4, 80 Stat. at 824-25, repealed by Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, Title VII, § 705, 103 Stat. 183, 416.
389. WHITE, supra note 38, at 67-68.
390. Id. at 72-73.
391. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
392. WHITE, supra note 38, at 72-73.
393. Id. at 70-71.
394. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 13 U.S.C.).
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stitutions Act of 1982."9' The two acts were anti-regulatory measures that
allowed S&Ls to make adjustable rate mortgages and diversify their port-
folios.3 96 The legislation allowed the S&Ls to offer consumer loans up to
a maximum of 30% of their assets, commercial real estate loans up to
40%, and unsecured commercial loans as high as 11%.117 In addition, the
two acts permitted the S&Ls to take equity positions in ventures if done
through a "service corporation., 398 Given the regulatory changes that
allowed portfolio diversity in high-risk ventures, coupled with changes in
ownership restrictions for S&Ls and an overall decrease in oversight and
net worth requirements, S&Ls became the perfect environment for high
risk takers who could use low-cost, risk-free and, most importantly, feder-
ally insured funds for all kinds of ventures.3 9 9
395. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. and 12 U.S.C.).
396. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act §§ 401, 406, 94
Stat. at 151-55, 159; Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act §§ 321-330, 96 Stat. at
1499-1502.
397. WHITE, supra note 38, at 73.
398. Id. Other regulatory changes in the early 1980s were of significance:
Regulatory Oversight. In the early 1980s, consistent with the Reagan administration's
disdain for regulatory oversight, the number of field force regulatory personnel (examiners
and supervisors) and examinations was reduced. Id. at 88.
Net Worth Requirements. Net worth requirements for S&Ls were lowered. Id. at 82-87.
"A thrift that failed to maintain its net worth level above the minimum requirement would
become subject, at least in principle, to tighter regulatory scrutiny and control. By lower-
ing the net worth requirement the Bank Board was reducing its ability to restrain thrifts
whose incentives for risk-taking were increasing." Id. at 82.
Ownership Restrictions. Traditionally, community interest, not personal interest, was the
governing ethos for most S&Ls, with directorships comprised mainly by local business and
community leaders. Fred E. Case, Deregulation: Invitation to Disaster in the S&L Industry,
59 FORDHAM L. REV. S93, $94-$95 (1991). Regulatory changes, however, allowed for a
small number of individuals, and in some instances one individual, to become majority
stockholders in S&Ls. Id. As a consequence, a smaller number of individuals could exert
a dominating influence on an S&L's daily operations. Id. at S97. As one commentator
observed:
Deregulation created a perfect environment for high-risk investors. Because
one or only a few individuals could own an association (in contrast to the tradi-
tional, broad community-based S&L directorship) they could engage in all kinds
of real estate lending and investing projects. Single-family lending could be and
was abandoned for all practical purposes. The historical safeguards-i.e., regula-
tions-that might have prevented such activities were no longer in place.
Id. (footnote omitted).
399. Congress contemporaneously raised the level of federal deposit insurance to
$100,000 for individual savings account. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1980). Having an insured
source of funds, of course, removes any market discipline on S&L investors.
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c. FIRREA
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA)4° codified some of the expansion of the D'Oench decision.
FIRREA extended the protection of section 1823(e) to the FDIC acting
in its corporate capacity, the partial successor of the FSLIC, the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation (RTC), and to affirmative claims against the FDIC
and RTC.
401
2. "Anything Goes": The State Response
Following the lead of the federal government, state governments
jumped into the deregulation frenzy. Multiple states, including Arkansas
and Arizona, deregulated the assets side of S&Ls.4 02 In California, an
"anything goes" policy allowed for investments in "just about
everything. ,403
3. The Fraud Epidemic
The failure of the S&L industry during the 1980s is common knowl-
edge. It is tempting and facile to ascribe such failure to rampant fraud
among S&L insiders. A S&L in the 1980s presented an alluring target to
400. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
401. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
402. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-402(B) (West 1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-
1860.1 (1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-178g (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 1921 (Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE § 26-1934 (Michie 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para.
3301-9a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 534.19 (West Supp. 1988); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-5601 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 289.705(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1988); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-504 (Michie 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 51A.53
(West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 369.144(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-
2-111 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-355 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 673.225 (Michie
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394-A:4 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:12b-48(21) (West
1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-10-50 (Michie 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 7-02-14 (Michie
1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1155.18 (Anderson 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 381.9 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 722.204 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 6020-
101(22) (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-23-15 (Michie 1989); S.C. CODE ANN.
34-1-110 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-3-106 (Michie 1993); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.05 (Vernon Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-7-41 (Michie
1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1836(b) (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 33.12.012,
33.12.014 (West 1986); Wis. ADMIN. CODE para. S-L 30 (1986). The assets referred to
involve S&L investments. Most states were more liberal in allowing S&Ls to diversify
their portfolios. During this period, the state legislation had what has been euphemistically
referred to as "wild card" provisions allowing state thrifts to diversify dramatically.
403. WHITE, supra note 38, at 65. Originally California S&Ls were limited to investing
only five percent of their total assets in real estate-owned investments ("REO"). 1971 Cal.
Stat. 411. In 1983, the five-percent restriction was lifted. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 7350 (West
1989). Later, following disastrous consequences, a ten-percent ceiling was imposed. See
id. (West Supp. 1994).
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any real estate developer with enough cash to buy it. After the deregula-
tion the S&L industry allowed the developer to work on his own pet
projects using other people's money. Tales of the Charles Keatings of the
S&L world are legion. But most commentators agree that the S&L crash
of the 1980s cannot be blamed on fraud alone.4°  A myriad of problems,
including mismanagement, careless underwriting standards, and a deteri-
orating real estate market ultimately led to the collapse of many thrifts.4 °5
At the time the S&L industry was being deregulated, however, the rate
of fraud and self dealing rose dramatically.406 Prior to deregulation,
fraud in the S&L industry existed only to a minor extent.4 °7 The govern-
ment estimated that at various times S&L failures caused by insider
wrongdoing ranged from twenty-five percent to sixty percent to one hun-
dred percent for large S&Ls.4 °8 One commentator noted that a congres-
sional committee reported that fraud occurred in seventy percent of the
failed institutions.40 9 The fraud involved in many S&L failures concerned
excessive valuations of property to justify larger loans to favored borrow-
ers or to justify larger asset values on S&L balance sheets, which, in turn,
increased an S&L's net worth and ability to declare dividends to its
owners.
404. See WHITE, supra note 38, at 115-17 (discussing the various sources of fraudulent
activity); Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the
S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S155, S162-68 (1991) (postulating reasons why congres-
sional blame on criminal activity for the S&L crisis is overstated).
405. WHITE, supra note 38, at 99-119. "Rapid growth by any business enterprise is
likely to involve management and organizational problems; thrifts are no exception. Com-
pounding these usual problems was the fact that this growth often involved new categories
of loans and investments. Thus, there were new opportunities to take risks-or just to
make mistakes." Id. at 102.
406. Id. at 115-17.
407. Only seven to nine percent of all cases involving fraud and embezzlement referred
to by the United States Department of Justice between 1978 and 1985 arose from S&Ls as
compared to 85 to 89% from banks. See Case, supra note 398, at S100.
408. For the sources of the varying estimates, see Case, supra note 398, at S100 (esti-
mating that 25% of industry losses are attributable to fraud); Green, supra note 404, at
S162-63; see also Jane D. Goldstein, Langley v FDIC: FDIC Superpowers-A License to
Commit Fraud, 8 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 559, 581 n.171 (1989) (stating that 58 bank fail-
ures were due in large part to insider abuse).
409. M. Danny Wall, The Tasks Ahead, 14 PROC. FED. HOME LOAN BANK OF SAN
FRANcIsCo 231, 233 (1988) (commenting that the congressional committee footnoted the
70% figure with the caveat that fraudulent behaviors constituted 20% of the overall
percentage).
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E. Ramona Savings & Loan: Fraudulent Schemes
The case of Bartram v. FDIC41° is illustrative of the S&L debacle of the
1980s. In April 1984, John Molinaro and Donald Mangano acquired
Ramona Savings and Loan Association, and during the following two
years the two purchasers transformed the S&Linto a real estate develop-
ment corporation. 41 ' Because of the deregulation of S&Ls in the 1980s,
Mangano & Molinaro were able to act through Ramona to exchange its
low-yield mortgages for Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation par-
ticipation certificates, expand Ramona's lendable assets by acquiring high
interest certificates of deposit, and to purchase a portfolio of real estate
properties. 41 2 A series of self-interested and illusory transactions that in-
creased the S&L's net worth allowed Ramona's owners to be paid $3.5
million in dividends in one year.413 In truth, Molinaro and Mangano
drained Ramona of its assets, and a later government audit revealed that
the S&L's net worth dropped from $3 million to negative $19 million.41 4
At the time Molinaro contacted the Bartrams in 1985, Molinaro was in
the midst of a series of fraudulent paper transactions designed to inflate
Ramona's net worth artificially. During 1984, Molinaro and Mangano
had purchased through Ramona a number of real estate projects that
caused great financial strain to the S&L." 5 In an effort to stave off fore-
closure by the FSLIC, the S&L owners sought to divest Ramona of its
real estate holdings.416 The S&L owners swapped thirty-two condomin-
ium units from the West Hampton Cove project with the Bartrams in
exchange for land held by the Bartams.417 Contrary to the oral represen-
tations made to the Bartrams, the S&L owners had no intention of devel-
oping the land, and immediately resold the parcels to another buyer,
recording an artificial paper profit.418 The representations made by Moli-
naro to the Bartrams, while indisputable, were typical of practices by
S&L owners during the 1980s. It was these misrepresentations asserted
410. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2115
(Cal. Feb. 27, 1992). For a more detailed factual summary of the Bartram case, see supra
notes 7-35 and accompanying text.
411. Second Amended Complaint at 4, FSLIC v. Molinaro, No. CV-86-6016-AHS
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1989).
412. Id. at 7-8.
413. Id. at 8.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 8-10.
416. Id. at 19-21.
417. Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Bartram v. FDIC, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (4th Civ. No. G009613), review denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 2115 (Cal. Feb. 27, 1992).
418. Id. at 3.
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
by the Bartrams that were eventually barred by the application of
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.419
IV. THE IRONY OF D'OENcH
A. The Anti-Safety Net
The Supreme Court designed the D'Oench rule to restore public confi-
dence in the financial institution system by allowing the public's represen-
tative, the government, to rely on the stated asset valuation of the
institution.42 ° D'Oench was designed to deter and, in some respects, pun-
ish those who lent themselves to an arrangement whereby the public
guardian could be misled.42 1 The D'Oench decision arose in the wake of
the Great Depression at a time when the public's confidence was at an
all-time low because of the systemic failure of savings institutions.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as S&L failures began to rise, the
D'Oench doctrine, not coincidentally, began to expand. Prior to this ex-
pansion, bank/S&L borrowers confronted a number of legal hurdles in
avoiding liability.422 To the extent the borrower alleged that a written
obligation was subject to unrecorded oral terms, the parol evidence rule
stood as a potential bar to the enforcement of those terms. 23 To the
extent the borrower executed a document she never meant to be en-
forced, the borrower's lack of consideration defense was subject to an
equitable estoppel rule.424 To the extent the borrower entered into a
transaction designed to deceive a regulator, she faced common law rules
of illegality and conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty.4 25
419. 315 U.S. 447 (1942), superseded by statute as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674
F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
420. See supra notes 154-56, 160-62 and accompanying text.
421. See D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 457 (stating that federal banking law "reveal[s] a federal
policy to protect [the FDIC], and the public funds which it administers, against misrepre-
sentations as to the securities or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which [the
FDIC] insures or to which it makes loans").
422. Case, supra note 398, at S93.
423. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 82, § 585, at 481 (stating that "[i]f testimony is offered to
prove that a party to the written integration made extrinsic promises.., by which would be
increased, his duties, liabilities, or other kinds of burdens without any consideration other
than that which is expressed in the writing, the testimony is ordinarily said to be excluded
by the 'parol evidence rule' ").
424. See Michael J. Barry, Note, Ways Around the Wrath: Exploring the Remaining Ex-
ceptions to the D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine and Section 1823(e), 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1127,
1130 (1993).
425. Id. Prior to the expansion of D'Oench, a borrower, absent the transfer of her
obligations to a valid HDC, was not stripped of her ability to contend that true mutual
assent was lacking because her assent was induced by a material misrepresentation. Id. at
1134-36.
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The expansion of D'Oench, largely through the expansive interpreta-
tion of section 1823(e) and the intermingling of D'Oench and section
1823(e) jurisprudence, caught these borrowers in a net.426 Those individ-
uals unlucky enough to have been defrauded by an oral representation
now found themselves incapacitated in the ability to raise traditional con-
tract defenses. Their ability to defend against liability on an obligation
was severely limited because to the extent a defense was not subject to a
common law restriction, it was now subject to a D'Oench/section 1823(e)
restriction.427
B. Why D'Oench Is Too Broad
1. The Fairness Critique
In Langley v. FDIC,428 the borrowers argued as a fallback position that
an equitable exception for fraud in the inducement should be read into
section 1823(e), at least where the FDIC has knowledge of the asserted
defense at the time it acquires the asset.429 Justice Scalia rejected any
argument based on the equities, finding that the equities favored the gov-
ernment.43° Justice Scalia made several points. First, he seemed to imply
that the borrower is in a better position to protect herself because she can
426. It should be noted that the "net" is not airtight. There are ways around D'Oench.
See id. at 1136 (analyzing an equitable exception).
427. Id. "Since Langley, a growing number of courts of appeals ... have directly held
that there is no equitable estoppel principle underlying the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine or
section 1823(e)." Id. (footnote omitted).
428. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
429. Id. at 93. The FDIC in Langley arguably was aware of the borrowers allegations
of fraud at the time the FDIC acquired the note because the lawsuit was pending at the
time of the FDIC's takeover. Id. at 89.
430. Justice Scalia, commenting on the petitioners' claims, wrote:
Petitioners are really urging us to engraft an equitable exception upon the plain
terms of the statute. Even if we had the power to do so, the equities petitioners
invoke are not the equities the statute regards as predominant. While the bor-
rower who has relied upon an erroneous or even fraudulent unrecorded represen-
tation has some claim to consideration, so do those who are harmed by his failure
to protect himself by assuring that his agreement is approved and recorded in
accordance with the statute. Harm to the FDIC (and those who rely upon the
solvency of its fund) is not avoided by knowledge at the time of acquiring the
note. The FDIC is an insurer of the bank, and is liable for the depositors' insured
losses whether or not it decides to acquire the note. The harm to the FDIC
caused by the failure to record occurs no later than the time at which it conducts
its first bank examination that is unable to detect the unrecorded agreement and
to prompt the invocation of available protective measures .... Thus, insofar as
the recording provision is concerned, the state of the FDIC's knowledge at that
time is what is crucial. But ... § 1823(e) is meant to ensure more than just the
FDIC's ability to rely on bank records at the time of an examination or acquisi-
tion. The statutory requirements that an agreement be approved by the bank's
board or loan committee and filed contemporaneously in the bank's records as-
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insist that the representations be recorded.43' Second, even if the bor-
rower is defrauded, so too is the public because the borrower's obligation
is subject to an unrecorded ("secret") liability. 432 Third, section 1823(e)
is not meant only to allow the FDIC to rely on official bank records, but
also insures that when a bank makes a loan, it is done in a deliberative
and prudent manner.433 None of these arguments is terribly compelling.
First, it is axiomatic that one who participates in a transaction is in a
better position to guard against its hazards than one outside the transac-
tion. The ability to avoid risk is a justification for loss shifting rules in
tort. But it is normally the justification where both parties are at least
partially at fault, such as in cases involving negligence or assumption of
the risk. Where both parties are blameless, the core inquiry is determin-
ing which party can better afford the loss. Where a bank official makes a
non-promissory misrepresentation, such as a misstatement about value, it
is difficult to perceive the defrauded person as the party at fault.434 The
expansive D'Oench doctrine shifts the burden of loss from the public in-
surance fund to the individual.435 But what was the justification for the
sure prudent consideration of the loan before it is made, and protect against col-
lusive reconstruction of loan terms by bank officials and borrowers ....
Id. at 94-95 (citations omitted). But see FDIC v. Manatt, 922 F.2d 486, 489 n.4 (comment-
ing that Congress did not intend for the requirements of section 1823(e)(2) to invalidate an
accord and satisfaction agreement), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991).
431. Langley, 484 U.S. at 91-93. "Certainly, one who signs a facially unqualified note
subject to an unwritten and unrecorded condition upon its repayment has lent himself to a
scheme or arrangement that is likely to mislead the banking authorities ..... Id. at 93.
432. Id. at 91-92. Justice Scalia noted that section 1823(e) was "necessary when a bank
is examined for fiscal soundness ... and when the FDIC is deciding whether to liquidate a
failed bank." Id. at 91 (citation omitted).
433. Id. at 92. Justice Scalia stated that the execution of the written note implicitly
signifies the bank's board or loan committee's approval, thus "ensur[ing] mature consider-
ation of unusual loan transactions by senior bank officials." Id.
434. If a promissory misrepresentation is made, i.e., the bank promises to fulfill some
contractual duty in the future, it is probably easier to attribute fault to a borrower because
presumably she should be wary enough to insist that the bank's obligation be spelled out in
writing. See, e.g., id. at 93; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 461 (1942)
(stating that "one who gives such a [fraudulent] note to a bank with a secret agreement...
must be presumed to know that it will conceal the truth from the vigilant eyes of the bank
examiners"), superseded as stated in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
435. It has been noted that this means that private business debtors are subsidizing the
insurance fund and that such subsidization serves no market efficiency or safety purpose.
Robert W. Norcross, Jr., The Bank Insolvency Game: FDIC Superpowers, The D'Oench
Doctrine, and Federal Common Law, 103 BANKING L.J. 316, 344-45 (1986); see also FDIC
v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1270 (6th Cir. 1985) (Merrit, J., dissenting) (arguing against ex-
tending HDC status to the FDIC because it redistributes "the cost of bank failure from
taxpayers, each of whom bears only a small fraction of the total cost, to a small number of
note makers whose individual liability may be significant"); W. Robert Gray, Limitations
on the FDIC's D'Oench Doctrine of Federal Common-Law Estoppel: Congressional Pre-
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creation of the FDIC and the FSLIC initially if not to assume the risk of
institutional failure, thereby displacing the risk from the shoulders of in-
dividuals? Moreover, other writers have noted that the borrower has lit-
tle or no control over satisfying the rigorous requirements of section
1823(e).436 Specifically, the borrower has no control over the content and
maintenance of bank records and must, as an act of faith, assume that the
bank official with whom she is dealing has authority and has received
formal approval for the transaction. 37 The borrower's reliance is espe-
cially misplaced where the bank official engages in intentional deception.
The second point made by Justice Scalia is that two parties have been
defrauded-the individual and the public-and that implicitly the pub-
lic's interest outweighs the interest of the individual.438 The whole justifi-
cation for the creation of a governmental oversight and insurance system,
however, was that individual losses in the aggregate had a tremendous
demoralizing effect on the public. It appears difficult, therefore, to sepa-
rate the public's interest from the interest of the individual. Is it not the
case that the public's confidence is eroded each time an individual is de-
frauded and can find no shelter from her appointed protectorate?
Finally, when Justice Scalia opined that section 1823(e) was created at
least in part to assure deliberative and thoughtful decision making as a
part of the loan making process,439 he does so based on sheer speculation
and inference. If that had been Congress' intent, why then restrict the
enforceability of unrecorded agreements only in the context of a takeover
by the FDIC? The more likely congressional intent was to codify more
expressly and rigidly D'Oench by establishing a bright line rule.44° Pru-
dence in the decision making process is already legally assured, at least to
emption and Authoritative Statutory Construction, 31 S. TEX. L.J. 245, 276 (1990) (arguing
that "the use of D'Oench and its statutory counterpart with their enormous power to quell
a debtor's defenses . . . to enhance the prospects of distribution to private claimants in
liquidation, is a use of governmental power for private ends whose propriety and constitu-
tionality might both be questioned").
436. See infra note 438 and text accompanying.
437. Kevin A. Palmer, The D'Oench Doctrine: A Proposal For Reform, 108 BANKING
L.J. 565, 575 (1991) (describing that "the borrower has no control over the content or
maintenance of bank records, can only assume that the bank officer has the authority to
act, [and] has no idea whether the board of directors of the bank has approved the
transaction").
438. Langley, 484 U.S. at 93-95. In denying the "equitable exception" to section
1823(e) argued by the petitioners in Langley, Justice Scalia noted that "[h]arm to the FDIC
(and those who rely upon the solvency of its funds) is not avoided by knowledge at the
time of acquiring the note." Id. at 94-95.
439. Id. at 95.
440. See supra notes 167, 175 and accompanying text.
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some extent, by virtue of the existence of traditional common law rules,
including the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds.
The inclusion of a fraud in the inducement defense within the parame-
ters of D'Oench is particularly inequitable due to the peculiar context in
which D'Oench is applicable. D'Oench applies only to those situations
where a bank has failed, and a statutory successor in interest (the FDIC)
has been appointed."' By definition the defrauded party can no longer
look to the original miscreant (i.e., the bank) for recourse because it no
longer exists.442 A public policy justification may exist for not permitting
the defrauded party affirmative recovery against the successor.44 3 How-
ever, where the victim merely seeks to avoid her own liability, little justi-
fication exists for denying a shift in responsibility where the culpable
party is judgment-proof.
Moreover, the expansion of D'Oench goes far beyond the mere con-
version of the FDIC into a HDC. While a normal HDC is immune to a
myriad of defenses to obligations owed to a payee under a negotiable
instrument, D'Oench has been expanded to encompass non-negotiable
instruments.444 It has been estimated, however, that in the typical FDIC
takeover, eighty percent of the assets acquired are non-negotiable. 4 5
Thus, D'Oench has exponentially changed the substantive commercial
law by making HDC status applicable in the majority of cases to situa-
441. It should be noted that federally insured banks and S&Ls cannot declare bank-
ruptcy. The normal bankruptcy scheme has been displaced by the comprehensive deposi-
tory insurance laws. In essence, when the FDIC is appointed receiver for an insolvent
bank, it is in the same analogous position as a bankruptcy trustee in an ordinary bank-
ruptcy. A bankruptcy trustee, however, is subject to any and all defenses the obligor could
have asserted against the debtor. See, e.g., Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101
(1966) (determining that "[tihe trustee succeeds only to such rights as the bankrupt pos-
sessed; and the trustee is subject to all claims and defenses which might have been asserted
against the bankrupt but for the filing of the petition"); In re Lapiana, 909 F.2d 221, 223
(7th Cir. 1990) (describing bankruptcy procedures regarding the enforcement of pre-bank-
ruptcy entitlements); In re Giorgio, 862 F.2d 933, 936 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that "a
bankruptcy trustee obtains rights of action belonging to the bankrupt subject to the same
defenses or limitations that a defendant might have asserted against the bankrupt him-
self"). The justification is obviously two-fold: (1) the trustee is not a HDC, and (2) the
original creditor/debtor, in essence, still exists in the form of the bankrupt estate and its
trustee.
442. Bank officers and directors, to the extent they personally participated in the fraud,
remain liable. But the problem of the ability to collect a judgment against an individual
(and in some cases an incarcerated individual as in Bartram) remains paramount.
443. There may be a sound public policy reason for not allowing the FDIC to be liable
on a money judgment in a action sounding in fraud. But, of course, in such a situation
recovery would not be borne out of the insurance fund, but rather out of the estate of the
insolvent institution.
444. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
445. Platt & Darby, supra note 254, at 720.
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tions where it previously had no relevance.446 D'Oench makes the excep-
tion the rule.
2. The Efficacy Critique
The case law beginning before Gunter and continuing through Langley
is based not so much on an equities concern, but instead on an efficiency
concern. Courts view the grant of "super" powers to the FDIC as an
efficient way of allowing the FDIC to sell failed institutions without shut-
ting them down.447 The D'Oench rule facilitates purchase and assump-
tion transactions." 8 However, the government can already accomplish
this objective without sacrificing the equities of the individual. In a typi-
cal purchase and assumption transaction, the FDIC has the ability to in-
demnify the purchasing institution from losses. Allowing a defrauded
borrower to assert fraud as a defense to an obligation on a note would
simply present an indemnity claim by the purchasing institution against
the FDIC." 9 The loss would again be shifted to the party best able to
bear it, the government.
C. Do We Need D'Oench?
1. Common Law Precedents
a. The Parol Evidence Rule
D'Oench is troublesome because it is too broad: it captures within its
net persons whose equitable claims would ordinarily not be barred. If
446. See cases cited supra note 445.
447. See, e.g., Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982).
448. See id.
449. One author noted:
[T]he realities of a purchase and assumption transaction make the presence of
"hidden" defenses irrelevant. Realistically, the FDIC cannot hope to evaluate its
own ability to collect each asset of a failed bank on an overnight basis from the
books and records of the bank. The bidding bank bases its bids on the failed
bank's market position, total liabilities, and the asset mix and yield, subject to the
loan classifications already completed during the bank examination process. The
bidding bank does not need to make a more accurate assessment of the assets,
because it is buying them with full recourse to the FDIC! If the loan turns out to
be uncollectible, for any reason, the bank merely sells the loan back to the FDIC.
Thus, the presence of hidden defenses to the payment of a failed bank's loans will
not affect the FDIC's ability or desire to implement a purchase and assumption
transaction. Indeed, these loans will, in all likelihood, already be in default and
on the problem loan list.
Marsha Hymanson, Note, Borrower Beware: D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823 Overpro-
tect the Insurer When Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 253, 282 (1988) (footnote omitted).
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D'Oench did not exist, however, a number of the-common law doctrines
would already provide adequate security for the FDIC.
A number of concerns are identifiable from the case law: (1) the desire
to maintain the integrity of bank/S&L record keeping;4 ° (2) the desire to
prevent collusive arrangements between bank officers and customers; 451
(3) the desire to insure that agreements are not subject to secret condi-
tions or terms;452 and (4) the need to restore and maintain public confi-
dence in the nation's financial institutions.453 Most of these goals can be
met in the absence of D'Oench because of current common law protec-
tions. The first such protection is the parol evidence rule.
The common law parol evidence rule specifies that if a written contract
constitutes a total integration, meaning that it is the final and exclusive
expression of the contracting parties' agreement, it may not be supple-
mented by prior contradictory or additional terms. Additionally, if the
written contract constitutes a partial integration, that is it is not meant to
be an exclusive expression, it may be supplemented by consistent addi-
tional terms.454 In the context of concerns under D'Oench, the parol evi-
dence rule has the following effect. For large real estate transactions
where the bank takes back paper (i.e., promissory notes), the paper itself
is part of the larger transaction that, if the paperwork is adequate, in the
aggregate probably constitutes a total integration.455 Thus, to the extent
at the time the documents are executed the notes are subject to undis-
closed terms concerning, for example, loan funding requirements, bank
obligations, and the like, these undisclosed terms or agreements are un-
enforceable under the parol evidence rule.456
To the extent that the documents for such transactions only constitute a
partial integration, the terms of the agreement may be supplemented by
450. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91 (1987) (stating that one of the purposes behind
section 1823(e) is "to allow federal and state bank examiners to rely on a bank's records in
evaluating the worth of the bank's assets").
451. FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1986) (stating that the D'Oench
doctrine "prevents those who give notes to federally insured banks from raising defenses
based on alleged secret agreements they had with the officers of failed banks").
452. FDIC v. MM&S Partners, 626 F. Supp. 681, 687 (N.D. Iii. 1985) (holding that
"D'Oench and § 1823(e) demonstrate that there is a policy in federal banking law... that
the FDIC should not be bound by anything outside a bank's loan documents").
453. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 870 (11th Cir.) (stating that the policies of the
FDIC "promot[e] the stability of and confidence in the nation's banking system"), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
454. See 1A CORBIN, supra note 57, §§ 209-217.
455. A total or complete integration is one in which, in view of its completeness and
specificity, appears to be the parties' complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209(3), 210(1) (1979).
456. See 1A CORBIN, supra note 82, § 213(1)-(2).
[Vol. 43:745
A Precedent Embalms A Principle
consistent additional terms. In the case of an accommodation note, the
term sought to be introduced (i.e., the agreement not to enforce the note)
is normally contradictory and thus unenforceable even if the transaction
is only partially integrated. One thing the parol evidence rule will not
exclude, however, is evidence that goes toward establishing that an agree-
ment is voidable because consent was induced by a misrepresentation.457
To the extent a borrower seeks to deny liability based on a material mis-
representation, at least of a non-promissory nature, she is able to do so
under the parol evidence rule.
b. Equitable Estoppel
A second protection available to the FDIC under the common law is
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. For over fifty years before the
Supreme Court decided D'Oench, numerous states had developed a com-
mon law estoppel rule for collusive borrower/bank official transactions.458
Specifically, these cases consistently held that where a borrower executes
a document she knows to be fallacious, she is estopped from denying its
unenforceability on the basis of, for example, lack of consideration.459
The same result would hold where a bank fraudulently represents that it
will not call a note due.46 ° The borrower, regardless of the bank's inten-
tions, has knowingly executed what she believes to be a false document
and should thereby be equitably estopped.
The common law estoppel rule, which could also be viewed simply as a
narrow interpretation of D'Oench, has the effect of making accommoda-
tion (i.e., non-liability) agreements unenforceable.4 61 An estoppel rule,
which is grounded in equitable considerations, however, would have no
application where a party did not knowingly participate in any deceptive
conduct.462 Therefore, most fraud in the inducement defenses, with the
exception of the accommodation note context, will be preserved.
457. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 82, § 3-7(c); CORBIN, supra note 82.
458. See supra notes 77-113 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 77-113 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 77-113 and accompanying text.
461. This interpretation, moreover, would be consistent with Justice Jackson's concur-
rence in D'Oench. See supra note 159.
462. One of the traditional elements of equitable estoppel is conduct by a party sought
to be estopped that would be inequitable and unconscionable not to estop. See Rody v.
Doyle, 29 A.2d 290, 293 (Md. 1942).
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c. Section 1823(e)
The third protection that is available to the FDIC arises not out of the
common law, but instead out of statutory law: section 1823(e).463 In
many respects section 1823(e) is duplicative of the parol evidence rule
and the common law estoppel rule.4" Matters that fall within both com-
mon law rules clearly also fall within the proscriptions of the statute. But
section 1823(e) goes further. To the extent an oral agreement is consis-
tent with the terms of a partially integrated contract, and to the extent the
contract does not represent a deceptive arrangement, the oral agreement
is not unenforceable under the parol evidence or common law estoppel
rule. It is, however, unenforceable under section 1823(e).
Section 1823(e) can be viewed as a super parol evidence rule. Under
section 1823(e) all transactions reduced by a bank to writing are conclu-
sively presumed to be totally integrated.465 Any term not found in the
transaction documents is therefore unenforceable. However, just as the
parol evidence rule does not apply to matters that establish the
voidability of a contract, section 1823(e) should be interpreted to apply
only to matters upon which the parties actually reach an "agreement."
Thus, even under section 1823(e), a fraud in the inducement defense
would be preserved because there is no true "agreement" in that context.
d. Illegality, Public Policy, and Conspiracy to Commit Breach of
Fiduciary Duty
To the extent that D'Oench originally concerned a situation in which a
borrower was validly a party to a fraud, the doctrines of illegality4 66 and
463. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. 111990). The existence of section 1823(e) raises
an interesting question: should D'Oench and its progeny (including, importantly, Gunter)
legally exist at all? In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Supreme
Court held that federal common law with regard to public nuisances in the context of
polluted waters no longer exists because of Congress' passage of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act. Id. at 317-19. The Court reasoned that federal common law in an area
of national concern is only applicable in the absence of an applicable act of Congress. Id.
When Congress addresses a question directly, the need for the creation of federal common
law disappears. The governing assumption is that it is up to the Congress, and not the
federal courts, to define the appropriate standards of federal common law. Id at 312-17.
Given the comprehensive expansion of section 1823(e) under FIRREA, an argument could
be made that Congress has specifically defined the rights and liabilities of the government
in bank/S&L takeovers, and thus there is no need for resort to the federal common law
created by D'Oench and Gunter. See Gray, supra note 435.
464. See supra notes 455-63 and accompanying text.
465. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). Moreover, viewed in this light, section 1823(e) extends
the parol evidence rule to post-contract formation agreements, thus invalidating many
waiver and estoppel defenses.
466. For an excellent example of a recent application of the illegality doctrine against a
bank borrower to preclude a claim against the FDIC, see Long v. South Bay Sav. & Loan
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conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty467 arguably prevent the borrower
from at least affirmative recovery, and probably prevent her from protec-
tive defensive shelter.
2. D'Oench, Langley and Bartram Revisited
How would the decisions in D'Oench, Langley, and Bartram have re-
sulted in the absence of the expansive D'Oench doctrine? D'Oench, it-
self, would be the least affected. The defendant in D'Oench was a
knowing accommodation note maker.4 68 Under the pre-D'Oench com-
mon law estoppel rule, his lack of consideration defense is foreclosed.
Under the parol evidence rule, the agreement not to enforce the note
expressly contradicts the terms of the note itself and would therefore be
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. The agreement would also be
a nullity under section 1823(e).
Langley, however, constitutes another matter. In Langley, the borrow-
ers alleged that they signed documents based on misrepresentations by
bank officials concerning material facts about the property purchased.469
Because the misrepresentations made the contract voidable and the bor-
rowers could not have been held to have participated in any deceptive
arrangement, neither the parol evidence rule nor the common law estop-
pel rule would apply. Section 1823(e) would also be inapplicable because
the Langleys' defense was not based on an "agreement." In the absence
of an expansive D'Oench doctrine, the Langleys therefore would be able
to resist enforcement of their obligations.
Bartram presents the most problematic case. Since the Bartrams al-
leged a fraud in the inducement defense, the parol evidence rule,47° the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, and section 1823(e) arguably should not
Assoc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). In Long, the borrower sued an S&L for
breach of a loan commitment agreement. Id. The FDIC took over the S&L and was found
liable at trial. Id. at 896 n.1. On appeal the FDIC had the judgment reversed because the
borrower illegally paid an officer of the S&L a kickback as an inducement to fund the loan.
Id. at 900-01. The Code of Federal Regulations provides a myriad of restrictions on loan
arrangements between federally insured institutions and their borrowers, thus providing
ample authority for invalidating many collusive arrangements and deceptive schemes.
467. The Restatement of Torts provides that "[a] person who knowingly assists a fiduci-
ary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty of tortious conduct and is subject to
liability for the harm thereby caused." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. c
(1979); see also Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (stating that an individual who
"knowingly join[s]" a fraudulent scheme will be held liable with other parties to the
scheme); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876.
468. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942), superseded as stated in
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
469. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1987).
470. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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apply. However, the defense was based on an "agreement" in the sense
that the S&L promised to do something in the future. Ordinarily, the
mere fact that a promise is not carried out is not evidence of fraud and
therefore the Bartrams' defense would ordinarily fail under the parol evi-
dence rule and section 1823(e). But if the borrower could present clear
and convincing evidence that the bank made a representation it never
intended to carry out, the defense is established. Thus, whether the Bar-
trams should escape the proscriptions of section 1823(e) boils down to a
matter of proof. Unless they can meet the rigorous scienter proof re-
quirements of a promissory fraud theory, their claim should be barred
under section 1823(e). 47 1
V. CONCLUSION
The principle upon which the D'Oench doctrine was originally based
concerned confidence: the public's confidence in the banking system as
guaranteed by their appointed guardian's confidence in the records of
banks. D'Oench was originally meant to deter and preclude misleading
financial arrangements between bank officials and bank customers. The
D'Oench precedent, however, has embalmed this principle by expanding
to apply to situations where public confidence is not served. Its applica-
tion is ironic. In an era of widespread fraud, the victims of fraud are
punished. Perhaps the only way to solve the inequities of D'Oench is for
Congress to repeal, or at least amend, section 1823(e). Until such time,
however, the doctrine of caveat emptor still endures.
471. This, of course, assumes arguendo that section 1823(e) applies. In Bartram it did
not because the FDIC was not an original party to the lawsuit.
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